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Section 1: recent developments, technical aspects, 
players and typology of profiling technologies12 
1.Developments in context and in profiling 
 
Profiling has come a long way since the 2010 recommendation.   For one thing, the explosion in 
technologies such as deep learning has brought analyses that were previously impossible well within 
reach.  At the same time, people have become aware of the opportunities and risks presented by those 
very technologies for society and individuals.  This report begins with a short review of these 
developments. 
1.1 Factors driving the technological changes 
The technologies that are currently revolutionising profiling did not just appear from one day to the 
next.  The concept of artificial intelligence saw the light of day in 1956 at the Dartmouth conference, 
and the term "machine learning" was suggested by Arthur Samuel in 1959.   Deep learning can be 
traced back to the 1980s.  There are various reasons why these research-generated  technologies have 
boomed in recent years. 
Firstly, research itself has made leaps and bounds in these spheres.  Powerful algorithms have been 
developed to analyse large quantities of data.   In their 2012 article "ImageNet Classification with Deep 
Convolutional Neural Networks"3, which rekindled interest in deep learning, Krizhevsky, Sutskever and 
Hinton trained a network of 650,000 neurones with 60 million parameters from ImageNet (1,200,000 
images from 1,000 different classes).   By way of  comparison, the LeNet-54 neural network proposed 
by Lecun, Bottou, Bengio and Haffner in 1998 had only 60,000 parameters and could only recognise 
digits.  This technical prowess made it possible to reduce the error rate in image recognition by 11%.  
Since then, a whole host of neural network architectures have been put forward. 
Secondly, data are currently available on an unprecedented scale.  On the one hand, varied collections 
of images, texts, sounds, raw data etc have been made public by various entities (research laboratories, 
private companies, public bodies, international organisations etc).  Examples include ImageNet5 as well 
                                                          
1 This first section was written by Professor Benoît FRENAY, IT specialist, under the supervision and with the 
assistance of Professor Yves POULLET 
2 Some companies or logos are used to give the reader a clear idea in the framework of this report.  This is not a 
judgement on the importance of these or the quality of the products offered. 
3 Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever and Geoffrey E. Hinton. 2012. ImageNet classification with deep convolutional 
neural networks. In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Neural Information Processing 
Systems - Volume 1 (NIPS'12), F. Pereira, C. J. C. Burges, L. Bottou and K. Q. Weinberger (Eds.), Vol. 1. Curran 
Associates Inc., USA, 1097-1105. 
4 LeCun, Y., Bottou, L., Bengio, Y. & Haffner, P. (1998). Gradient-based learning applied to document 






as the open data of cities such as Paris6, London7, New York8 or Namur9, sites such as Wikipedia10 which 
supply enormous quantities of text, the YouTube-8M dataset11 with its 237,000 video segments 
published by Google, the International Collaboration on Cancer Reporting12 which seeks to produce 
standardised datasets for different types of cancer and makes recommendations along these lines13 
etc.  On the other hand, those entities are building their in-house data collections for their own use.  It 
may be a public body seeking to improve the public services it provides, a private company wishing to 
improve or sell its products, an on-line multimedia service etc.  In the second part of this document we 
will take another look at the great diversity of possible uses of profiling and profilers. 
Thirdly, developments in hardware or software technologies have opened up the possibilities for 
running resource-hungry algorithms on large quantities of data.  In 2012, Krizhevsky, Sutskever and 
Hinton were already using graphics processing units or GPUs, graphics cards initially developed for PCs 
(video games, graphics rendering etc).  GPUs are used extensively to accelerate deep learning 
computations by several orders of magnitude and to quickly train new neural networks.  While the 
storage of large quantities of data is nothing new (one example being Teradata founded in 1979), other 
technologies emerged in the 2000s, such as MapReduce (2004) and its open-source implementation 
Hadoop (2006), and are inextricably linked to the "Big Data phenomenon". 
Fourthly, for private stakeholders, the data are an inestimable source of information and, in some 
cases, constitute their core activity, so it is not surprising that they are investing heavily in this area.  
Some corporations are actively involved in research into artificial intelligence and new technology 
development, with considerable budgets devoted to these activities. 
In conclusion, the rapid developments of the last fifteen years or so is explained by the convergence 
of a number of factors: efficient algorithms can now exploit large quantities of data thanks to hardware 
and software technologies in turn made possible by research and substantial investment by both public 
stakeholders (including backers such as the European Union with Horizon 2020) and private 
stakeholders.  These developments have paved the way for innovations that are beneficial for 
individuals and the community but also carry risks at both individual and community level (see section 
2). 
 
1.2 Perception and impact of technological change 
 
The development of artificial intelligence, machine learning and deep learning have had a substantial 
impact on profiling.  While profiling did not necessarily require the use of these technologies, they now 
make it possible to exploit personal data far more effectively. 
The rapid progress of smart technologies and the enthusiasm for them have naturally led to them 
being applied in numerous contexts in recent years.  On the one hand, this is enabling us to tackle 
problems that were previously difficult to resolve, effectively and on a large scale (automatic diagnosis 













of skin cancer with a smartphone14, fraud detection, personalised advice on sales or multimedia 
platforms etc).  On the other hand, the widespread use of artificial intelligence for profiling has 
highlighted issues connected to information technology, sociology, ethics, law etc: risks run by 
employees in recruitment or their career, ethical use of profiling, rights and obligations linked to data 
use, developing more transparent and more easily interpretable algorithms, reducing problems of bias 
and discrimination, making algorithms more resistant to noise and attacks etc. 
In parallel, public and private players, including the media, are exposing the uninitiated to these 
technologies, as they use them and receive information through them.  The claims made regarding 
these technologies come from both ends of the spectrum.  On the one hand, people are told about 
self-driving cars, artificial intelligence robots playing Go or poker and personal assistants for day-to-
day living.  On the other hand, they are warned of potential abuses, threats to democracy, 
discrimination and job losses.  It is difficult for people to know what to think, and this is a threat to 
public debate, which can no longer take place in the right conditions.  And when they are bombarded 
by the hard sell, people also have trouble working out the real capabilities and limits of the systems 
being sold to them.  On a broader scale, the decision-makers within public and private bodies are 
sometimes equally confused.  Moreover, it is not easy to find technical and non-technical staff who 
are trained in these technologies.  There is a real societal problem of education in artificial intelligence 
and, in particular, the specific issues of profiling. 
Society's swift and widespread uptake of artificial intelligence technologies for profiling therefore lays 
bare unprecedented potential uses, while raising technical and non-technical questions and an urgent 
need for education at all levels of society. 
 
1.3 Responses to technological change 
 
There have been various responses in recent years to artificial intelligence and its impact on profiling.  
On the one hand, regulations are applicable and reports have been drawn up at different levels, such 
as the GDPR Regulation and the "Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI" report at European level, the "AI 
for humanity" report in France or AI4Belgium in Belgium.  On the other hand, funding has been set up 
to support research development, such as the recent "H2020 Call on European Network of Artificial 
Intelligence Excellence Centres". 
Training has been put in place at different levels (universities, colleges, training centres etc) to train 
employees to cope with the challenges of profiling and artificial intelligence. Discussions are under way 
with a view to educating children, teenagers and the general public, notably in Belgium, Finland, France 
and the Netherlands.  Numerous research laboratories and corporations are looking in tandem at the 
positive impact that profiling can have on teaching: personalised pathways for pupils with exercises 
and lessons tailored to their profile, detection and prevention of school drop-out on the basis of the 
pupil's results and activities etc. 
In the world of research, the issues mentioned above are tackled head-on: many scientific conferences 
include sessions devoted to problems of bias, "interpretability", reliability, ethics, security, preserving 
anonymity etc.  At the same time, corporations have also been made aware of these issues and are 
                                                          
14 Esteva, Andre & Kuprel, Brett & Novoa, Roberto & Ko, Justin & M Swetter, Susan & M Blau, Helen & Thrun, 






making efforts accordingly. Initiatives such as the UN "AI for Good" platform promote the beneficial 
use of artificial intelligence.  Despite all these initiatives, it is clear that the existing problems are far 
from being resolved.  At present it is difficult to ensure perfect "interpretability", reliability or security 
for many of the artificial intelligence systems used in profiling.  Research is more necessary than ever, 
particularly in the IT field, from which the technical solutions will come.  But an interdisciplinary 
approach is indispensable to better meet those challenges. 
In conclusion, the technological developments of recent years have prompted numerous responses in 
the spheres of politics, law, education, research and business.  One tendency observed in recent times 
is particularly noteworthy.  Many researchers in the fields of artificial intelligence, machine learning 
and deep learning are leaving research laboratories for private-sector companies.  While this 
movement is normal and desirable, it is on an unprecedented scale.  In the artificial intelligence sphere, 
we are seeing a real privatisation of research.  It is becoming difficult for universities to keep their best 
talent.  An ambitious policy of support for independent research is now needed more than ever so that 
Europe remains the scientific leader in this area.  Meeting the challenges of profiling calls for strong, 
perennial fundamental and applied research, which reports its findings and progress and accepts peer 
discussion in return. 
Chapter 2. Players 
Using artificial intelligence, machine learning and deep learning for profiling makes setting up new 
projects a more complex business.  It is now rare for a project to involve just one player to create the 
necessary algorithms and adapt, configure and use them.  The data also have to be acquired, stored 
and organised.  What is more, the profiling components are usually only one part of a far larger system 
in which they must be integrated.  This section looks at a classic example of using machine learning 
and the variants tailored to different scenarios involving a variable number of different types of 
players. 
2.1 Base scenario: a single player 
The artificial intelligence techniques used for profiling fall chiefly within the domain of machine 
learning and, in some cases, more specifically deep learning, a sub-discipline of machine learning that 
is particularly useful when images, video, sound or text are processed.  Figure 1 shows the main phases 
of machine learning: training and prediction. 
 





Training entails exploiting a dataset in order to learn a model using those data.  The model uses 
mathematical abstraction providing a simplified description of the data to resolve the task at hand.  
For example, an estate agency might want to predict the price of property according to its surface area, 
the number of bedrooms, the presence of nearby shops, noise pollution indicators, the age of the 
property etc.  In such a case, it will have data on numerous properties it has already sold, for which the 
sale price will be known: these are the training data, which it will then use to arrive at a formula along 
the lines of: 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 × 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 + 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑠 × 𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑠
+  𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑠 ×  𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 pollution × pollution
+ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 age × 𝑎𝑔𝑒 
in which the value of the parameter of each characteristic is initially unknown.  The training will involve 
looking for the best values of these parameters to find the closest possible match to the prices 
observed for the properties previously sold.  The hypothesis is that the model (ie the formula with the 
best parameter values) will make it possible to correctly estimate the price of properties coming onto 
the market.  A linear model of this kind is too simple to be able to provide a perfect explanation of 
market prices but it will probably yield an initial estimate that will be accurate enough for the agency's 
needs. 
The prediction phase will use the model taught to the machine using the data to make predictions for 
newly available property.  In practice, a model can predict a number, but also a category, which is more 
common in profiling.  Accordingly, we can use the data available on a large number of customers to 
teach a customer retention model making it possible to predict whether there is a risk of a customer 
going over to the competition.  The model may be a linear formula, as above, but it may also take the 
form of logic rules like figure 2 or be rather more complex, such as the Inception-v3 neural network 






Figure 2: example of a model of categories expressed in the form of logic rules organised in a decision tree15. 
 
Figure 3: example of a neural network (deep learning) with a parameter count of 23,885,392 (Google's Inception-v3)16. 
In the scenario presented here, only one player is involved: the estate agency which acquires, stores 
and manages the data, devises and uses machine learning algorithms and then deploys them.  In 
practice, profiling is rarely down to a single player and the situation is far more complex. 
Before going any further, the distinction should be noted between artificial intelligence, machine 
learning and deep learning.  Artificial intelligence is an IT discipline which creates new algorithms 
capable of resolving problems normally requiring human intelligence.  This covers a variety of tasks 
                                                          
15 Figure reproduced from Tanner, L; Schreiber, M; Low, JG; Ong, A; Tolfvenstam, T; Lai, YL; Ng, LC; Leo, YS; Thi 
Puong,L; Vasudevan, SG; +3 more... Simmons, CP; Hibberd, ML; Ooi, EE; (2008) Decision tree algorithms predict 
the diagnosis and outcome of dengue fever in the early phase of illness. PLoS neglected tropical diseases, 2 (3). 
e196. ISSN 1935-2727 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0000196. 





such as planning, games, meeting constraints, logical reasoning (notably expert systems) or 
probabilistic reasoning, processing of the spoken word, text or images etc.  Among the artificial 
intelligence techniques, machine learning has the specific characteristic of being able to exploit the 
available data to allow the creation of artificial intelligence which learns.  More specifically, when the 
data are images, sound or text, deep learning, a sub-domain of machine learning, is commonly used to 
create networks of neurones geared to model these types of data. 
2.2 Using specialised libraries 
 
Figure 4 takes the previously developed scenario with a focus on training.  A single player is involved: 
the one providing the final service incorporating profiling.  Even for a machine learning specialist, it is 
rare to not at least use support from specialised libraries, as figure 5 shows.  A library is a set of ready-
to-use functionalities (in other words, implementations of algorithms) for the easy creation of new 
programmes.  In this way, when a development team uses a library for a new project, it avoids having 
to  reinvent the wheel and (re)develop a whole host of commonly used algorithms.  For example, 
experts would not implement a model such as support vector machines themselves; they would 
instead use the LIBSVM library which provides effective implementation of that model.  A model like 
this has been the subject of thousands of scientific publications and is very tricky to implement. 
Many machine learning algorithms are already implemented (ie made available) in free open source 
libraries such as LIBSVM, LIBLINEAR, scikit-learn, Weka, Keras, TensorFlow, PyTorch or their 
commercial equivalents.  These libraries are extraordinary time-savers, making it possible to achieve 
competitive results.  Effective and reliable implementation of many machine learning algorithms 
requires substantial expertise and a considerable amount of time, often hinging on decades of 
research. 
 
Figure 4: training phase where there is only one player. 
 
Figure 5: training phase using specialised libraries. 
The "libraries" mentioned above are devised thanks to the considerable work carried out by large non-
profit communities or corporations.  In the case of open source and free libraries, they are available 
on the Internet and can be downloaded by any actor who wishes to use them.  They are usually 
accompanied by a disclaimer that they provide no guarantees (in the legal sense) and must be used 





machine learning, which are very widely used and without which most current-day developments 
would not exist, particularly in deep learning.  Although they are non-commercial in nature, the fact 
that they have been developed by big communities is often a guarantee of quality.  Our 
recommendations will have to take account of the need for these libraries to be developed, an 
undeniable factor in innovation, and look to self-regulation in scientific research and researcher 
communities for safeguards against the risks linked to their use for profiling.  
2.3 Subcontracting learning 
In this case, the player wishing to use a profiling service does not have the expertise to do so and may 
therefore call on the services of one or more players who will design algorithms tailored to the needs, 
thus delegating the training phase as shown in figure 6.  Obviously, the players will follow the 
subcontracting rules laid down. 
 
Figure 6: delegating the training phase to an outside provider. 
There are a number of possible reasons for delegating the training phase.  Even when the technical 
expertise is there, the sheer quantity of data used in profiling may be such (people often talk of "Big 
Data", even if the term only really applies to a few major players) that a specific infrastructure must be 
set up or used, either to store the information or to analyse it.  That calls for the deployment of 
hardware and software resources requiring skills lying outside the field of machine learning.  One 
extreme (but common) case is the use of "cloud"-style platforms where a player pays for access to 
substantial storage and computing resources to run their own algorithms.  And, in some cases, it may 
simply be more efficient to call on a profiling specialist. 
 
2.4 The special case of deep learning 
 
In the case of deep learning, the problems involved in designing and running algorithms are even more 
substantial.  To train the Inception-v3 network shown in figure 3, Google's researchers had to use 50 
GPUs.  Each GPU can cost up to several thousand euros, outlay that is well beyond the reach of an 
SMB.  In addition, designing suitable neural network architecture requires sound experience of deep 
learning.  For these reasons, it is difficult for a small player to develop their own deep learning model. 
In practice, for profiling activities entailing the recognition of images similar to those found in image 
datasets, you do not need to create your own model.  Some major players have made models they 
have trained using large collections of images freely available at no cost, enabling smaller players to 
download and use them straightaway, as in figure 7, without having to bear the training costs.  This is 
common practice in the world of research and teaching, particularly in the study of deep learning or 





for in the design of the model will be recognised.  A network like DeepLoc17 trained using images of 
yeast cultures under the microscope will be useless for distinguishing between cats and dogs.  Likewise, 
Inception-v3 could not be used instead of DeepLoc as it recognises only "natural" images (dog, cat, 
tree etc). 
 
Figure 7: using a pre-trained model. 
Numerous free-access networks have been trained using the same set of images regarded as 
authoritative in the scientific community: ImageNet.  As shown in figure 8, this adds in a new player: 
the entity which devises and makes available the image dataset, without associating any models with 
it. 
 
Figure 8: addition of the image dataset provider. 
For machine learning to work, the image datasets have to contain images that are sufficiently varied 
and associated with predefined categories.  ImageNet contains 1,200,000 images belonging to 1,000 
different classes.  However, the conditions in which the images are collected and associated with 
categories can have a considerable impact on the models that will be developed and used by the other 
players.  Figure 9 shows the breakdown of the geographic origin of the images: there is a clear bias in 
representativity18 which explains why certain images are not well recognised by neural networks 
trained using ImageNet.  The same problem has been encountered with a number of commercial facial 
recognition systems trained using collections chiefly made up of male Caucasians19 (see figure 10).  As 
                                                          
17 Kraus, Oren & T Grys, Ben & Ba, Jimmy & Chong, Yolanda & J Frey, Brendan & Boone, Charles & J Andrews, 
Brenda. (2017). Automated analysis of high‐content microscopy data with deep learning. Molecular Systems 
Biology. 13. 924. 10.15252/msb.20177551. 
18 Shankar, Shreya, et al. "No classification without representation: Assessing geodiversity issues in open data 
sets for the developing world." arXiv:1711.08536 (2017). 
19 Buolamwini, J. & Gebru, T.. (2018). Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender 





pointed out previously, image datasets like ImageNet are made available without any (legal) guarantee 
and it is for the users of those images to check that they are suitable for the intended application.  
ImageNet is described in detail in "ImageNet: A Large-Scale Hierarchical Image Database"20 and 
"Construction and Analysis of a Large Scale Image Ontology"21 and has been used in many studies.  In 
the medical sphere, datasets may be guided by recommendations, such as those of the International 
Collaboration on Cancer Reporting22. 
 
Figure 9: breakdown of the geographic origin of the images in ImageNet23. 
 
Figure 10: content of three image datasets used to train facial recognition systems24. 
2.5 The pre-trained models revolution 
 
In many cases, it is not enough to use an existing deep learning model without tweaking it.  However, 
it is rare to have the quantity of images needed to train a "deep learning" neural network: a collection 
of a few hundred or a few thousand images is nowhere near enough but this is very often the size of 
the datasets available to a player wishing to develop a service using deep learning.  The images do not 
only have to be acquired but also be manually labelled one by one.  In a medical context, for example, 
the process is long and costly because of the expertise and equipment required.  Moreover, the 
number of patients available for such research will be limited. 
                                                          
20 J. Deng, W. Dong, R. Socher, L.-J. Li, K. Li and L. Fei-Fei, ImageNet: A Large-Scale Hierarchical Image 
Database. IEEE Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 2009. 
21 J. Deng, K. Li, M. Do, H. Su, L. Fei-Fei, Construction and Analysis of a Large Scale Image Ontology. In Vision 
Sciences Society (VSS), 2009 
22 See the list of publications featured on the site http://www.iccr-cancer.org 
23 Figure reproduced from Shankar, Shreya, et al. "No classification without representation: Assessing 
geodiversity issues in open data sets for the developing world." arXiv:1711.08536 (2017). 
24 Figure reproduced from Buolamwini, J. & Gebru, T.. (2018). Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy 





When a player wants to develop a deep learning model but does not have enough images, there is a 
simple and often effective solution, which entails simply using the small image dataset to retrain a 
model that has already been trained with a larger image dataset (see figure 11).  In a 2017 study25 for 
example, researchers at Stanford took the Inception-v3 network that had been pre-trained on 
ImageNet and retrained it using 129,450 photos of skin lesions from 18 image datasets that were 
divided into in 2,032 classes, exploiting what Inception-v3 had already learnt in order to resolve a 
complex problem, using a more limited number of images.  There are plenty of other examples in 
scientific literature of "transfer learning" techniques (transferring to one problem what the network 
has learnt about another problem to arrive at a better solution). 
 
Figure 11: retraining and using a pre-trained neural network by transfer learning. 
When  transfer learning is used, the biases mentioned above can come from several sources of data: 
those used to pre-train the model and those used to retrain it.  It must be emphasised, however, that 
transfer learning is often inevitable in deep learning.   
2.6 Involvement of players from other disciplines 
The scenarios focus on the technical aspects of machine learning but, in addition to artificial 
intelligence specialists, many other players will also become involved: profiling is by nature 
multidisciplinary as it requires input from specialists in databases, software engineering, man-machine 
interfaces, law, ethics etc.  The infrastructures to store the data have to be designed, the software 
systems for profiling have to be painstakingly constructed in a process beginning with the analysis of 
the needs and culminating in system release, the interfaces for exploiting profiling results (for example 
for effectively presenting product recommendations to a customer) must be designed, it must be 
ensured that the profiling system complies with legislation on personal data (among others), checked 
that the profiling system contains no bias and does not discriminate against any category of individuals 
etc.  All these players must be taken into account in discussion on profiling as their contribution is vital. 
 
 









There are many possible configurations of players in profiling.  Within those configurations, each player 
bears a certain responsibility and has a different impact on the final outcome.  The case of open source 
players is a special one: they have no control over the players who use the data, algorithms and models 
they provide but they do have a crucial role in innovation where profiling is concerned.  It is 
indispensable, therefore, when considering the legal aspects of profiling, to take account of the specific 
characteristics of the players and assign adequate responsibility to each of them.  In the case of open 
source tools and datasets, it should be noted that that effort towards documentation has already been 
undertaken and that, by definition, open source projects are subject to criticism and improvement by 
their users.  Research in the area of artificial intelligence is a source of information on these tools and 
their limits. 
Chapter 3.Typology of profiling, technical 
solutions and purposes  
 
Numerous types of profiling are possible and can be distinguished by the type of technology used and 
the purpose of the profiling.  A few of these possibilities are reviewed below. 
3.1 Types of technical solutions  
 
Profiling uses the data available for a person in order to better understand them or infer other 
information (risk of developing an illness, consumer behaviour etc).  When machine learning must be 
used to build a model for profiling, the form of profiling must be specified in technical terms in order 
to choose the right technology. 
If we know in advance what purpose profiling is supposed to serve and we have examples of correct 
responses for a sufficiently large sample of people, supervised machine learning will be used.  A 
supervised algorithm is geared to learning the link between the data available for a person and what 
the profiling entity wants to be able to say about that person.  In a psychological study carried out on 
several volunteers, we might for example look for the link between the data gathered via 
questionnaires and their level of stress at work.  For this kind of profiling, the purpose is clearly 
established.  A supervised machine learning algorithm will be able to use all the questionnaires 
obtained and see how to best predict stress levels at work based solely on the responses given by each 
individual. 
A number of variants can be distinguished among supervised ‘problems’, including classification, 
regression or ordinal regression.  Classification assigns each individual to one of a predefined set of 
possible categories.  This could relate to illnesses, customer types etc.  When the idea is to assign a 
number to a person, the analysis involves regression, for example to predict a person's age on the 
basis of a photograph, typically by using deep learning, while ordinal regression seeks to predict a level 





Systems geared to "recommendations" based on profiling may also use machine learning.  This entails 
predicting an individual's preferences on the basis of other people's preferences, as commonly done 
on on-line purchasing platforms or in targeted advertising.  Collaborative filtering is a recommendation 
technique which compares the consumer histories of the different users of a service, on the 
assumption that people with similar habits will be receptive to similar products that they have not yet 
consumed.  Numerous variants exist.  
In some profiling scenarios, it is sometimes difficult if not impossible to fully specify the purpose in 
advance, as the response expected by the profiling system is not yet known.  This is typically the case 
when the aim is to segment the population of a country, the patient community of a hospital or a 
company's customers.  Groups of people will be found automatically by algorithms, the point being 
precisely to learn new things about the citizens, patients or customers concerned in order to better 
understand them, develop services better tailored to them, identify sub-populations at risk etc.  This 
unsupervised profiling is very common and raises the question as to what extent it is possible or 
desirable to precisely define the purpose of profiling. Profiling of this kind is generally intended to 
explore the data and isolate new knowledge that will then be exploited by humans, often in a 
preliminary phase. 
Another form of profiling where the expected behaviour is difficult to predict is anomaly detection, 
which involves detecting "outliers" within a population, ie individuals that are significantly different 
from the rest of the population.  Someone who uses a service in an abnormal way might be detected 
(case of fraud) or quite simply someone who should be ruled out of other analyses as they would skew 
the results. 
There are also intermediary situations in profiling.  For example, semi-supervised algorithms can be 
used to carry out supervised profiling, even if the expected response is known only for a limited 
number of individuals.  This means that a large population of individuals can be used to build a 
classification model, even though the correct category is known only for a low percentage of them.  
This is a common scenario when the data are easy to acquire but the response (category, number, 
preference) is costly and difficult to obtain, particularly if it requires intervention by human specialists.  
This is the case for image processing for example. 
In conclusion, there are many different types of algorithms for profiling.  Some of those algorithms will 
themselves help their designers to better understand the people they are studying and more closely 
define the profiling they are aiming for.  It appears important to take account of this variety and the 
fact that it is particularly difficult to predict what personal data will be useful in the case of 
unsupervised algorithms.  It must also be noted that the aforementioned algorithms are capable of 
processing not only digitised information but also images, sound, text, sequences etc. 
3.2 Types of profiling and their purposes 
 
Part II of this document analyses the purposes of profiling in more detail but it is worth making a few 
comments here on the basis of the technical discussion above. 
The purpose of profiling will be more or less specific depending on whether the profiling is clearly 
defined to begin with or more exploratory in nature.  An additional factor is an important distinction 
made in machine learning: a model (and therefore profiling) can have a descriptive or predictive aim.  
A descriptive model describes in comprehensible form the relation (ie the mathematical formula or 
logic rules) between someone's personal data and the response sought.  Its aim is to better understand 





patients and not others.  In contrast, a predictive model has the sole aim of predicting the response 
sought for a specific individual.  It is not strictly necessary, therefore, for this model to be transparent, 
as it must above all be accurate.  In practice, some models may be suitable to a certain extent for both 
description and prediction, such as linear models (see the example of the estate agency) or decision 
trees (see figure 2).  Neural networks are a counterexample: the price to be paid for their predictive 
power is less transparency.  In particular, deep learning makes it possible to process images, sound or 
text, but without us being able to make sense of the calculations carried out.  This problem does not 
stem from the fact that the calculations are not known (they are known exactly, otherwise the 
computer would be incapable of running them) but rather from the fact that they are far too complex 
to be "unravelled" by the human mind in order to arrive at a precise interpretation.  There are plenty 
of tools such as saliency maps that give a vague idea of the area of the image used by deep learning to 
take a decision but they are insufficient and their reliability is a subject of debate26. 
In the design of a profiling system, one important choice will be the compromise between transparency 
and accuracy.  Most transparent models are less accurate for resolving complex problems.  On the 
other hand, the more accurate models are often difficult to interpret and not very transparent.  The 
risk to which the individuals profiled are exposed seems to be an important factor in determining 
where the compromise must lie.  Not understanding the workings of an algorithm that recommends 
music is probably less of an issue than having no explanation of an algorithm that refuses credit.  But 
in some cases, despite a high risk, it may be difficult to justify the use of a less accurate but transparent 
profiling system whereas a far more accurate system would be possible.  One area where this problem 
arises is medicine: is it better to have a powerful but opaque model or a less reliable model that we 
can explain? 
Finally, we must stress one specific characteristic of artificial intelligence technologies, machine 
learning and deep learning that has enabled profiling to come on in leaps and bounds.  These 
algorithms came from scientific research, which is also carried out in certain laboratories owned by 
large corporations, resulting in a whole host of large open source libraries and datasets that are 
publicly accessible.  The large-scale use of machine learning is made possible by these algorithms and 
datasets which have been documented and evaluated in hundreds of thousands of scientific 
publications.  The algorithms present in these libraries are often based on the latest scientific 





                                                          
26 Julius Adebayo, Justin Gilmer, Michael Muelly, Ian Goodfellow, Moritz Hardt, and Been Kim. 2018. Sanity 
checks for saliency maps. In Proceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Neural Information 
Processing Systems (NIPS'18), Samy Bengio, Hanna M. Wallach, Hugo Larochelle, Kristen Grauman, and Nicolò 





Section II27: Profiling and privacy: from 
legal considerations to recommendations  
 
Chapter I: CHALLENGES AND DEFINITION OF PROFILING  
1. Introduction: The term ‘profiling’ brings together various operations that may pursue 
a number of purposes and present very different degrees of risk.  The profiling 
operation is not necessarily linked to the use of information systems.  Each and every 
one of us "profiles" other people at some point.  We all try to categorise those around 
us on the basis of their personal attributes whether relevant, objective, permanent or 
not.  In short, we use the subjective or objective data in our possession to categorise 
others and infer, without doubt with some margin of error in our assessment, other 
traits or tendencies of which we know nothing.  Profiling is therefore in the nature of 
any human being, as we all try to put a label on the reality around us or, to put it 
another way, place other people in categories so that we can get a better handle on 
them and behave accordingly.  However, using information systems changes the ways 
and scope of profiling for various reasons.  
• The first is that present-day information systems, through their interactivity and 
omnipresence, make it possible to increase - and exponentially so – the amount of 
data gathered.  Whereas data storage and communication capacities were 
previously limited, today, firstly, they have become pretty well infinite, as 
demonstrated by the phenomenon of Big Data and, secondly, the Internet of things 
and the multiplication of services that are just a mouse-click away make it possible 
to capture increasingly trivial aspects of everyday life.  Whoever is in possession of 
those data will be able to ‘profile’ the individual concerned in ever closer detail.  
• The second is the use of ever more powerful algorithms to analyse that quantity of 
data.  Twenty years ago ‘profilers’ used the help of algorithms based on a pattern 
replicating human reasoning, creating what were known as expert systems capable 
of standing in for (or in all events assisting) the data controller in that they 
automatically transposed and applied the ‘rules’ set up by human experts on the 
basis of their experience. These systems guided reasoning and avoided the 
subjectivity and risks of discrimination that any human decision-maker would have. 
These expert systems, which use totally transparent algorithms, are now being 
superseded by what we call machine learning systems or deep learning systems 
capable of working on far more data than could be processed by experts.  These 
systems run correlations between expanding volumes of data using algorithms 
which feed on the data encountered and gradually refine themselves accordingly.  
The variety and complexity of the ‘models’ followed and developed by these 
                                                          







algorithms are such that their functioning loses some of its transparency, even for 
the people who developed and/or use them.  
 
2. Advantages of ‘automated’ profiling – So there is a difference between digital 
‘profiling’ and human profiling.  Digital profiling presents advantages but also risks for 
the individual28.  These risks call for regulation enabling trust on the part of those who 
are subject to such processing or have its results imposed on them and maximising the 
benefits linked to the use of these decision-making systems or aids.  
 
The advantages of profiling are quite clear for the corporations and administrations 
which use such systems.  
• For corporations it is all about optimising their actions and investment.  
Profiling will enable corporations to target their clientele, determine their 
strategies using any number of parameters, better understand the reactions of 
a given community etc.  It is also an aid for making the right choice of location 
and for employee recruitment or promotion. Finally, it will help them to detect 
possible cyberattacks, fraud etc.  
•  For the public authorities29, the advantages of these systems lie firstly in having 
a better grasp of the real situation and then better framing public authority 
action strategies in areas such as policies on employment, fighting crime or 
education. Administrations also see them as a means of more effectively 
applying their regulations.  
• For a subject who has been profiled, the advantages are equally well-known. 
One example is the health sector, where analysis by artificial intelligence of a 
patient's clinical antecedents and tumour tissue cross-referenced with those of 
thousands of other patients guides the doctor towards a given course of action 
in the space of a few seconds and predicts an operation's chances of success. A 
second example relates to benefits for consumers: someone wishing to buy a 
lawnmower best suited to their needs and faced with a highly diverse market 
offer can be gradually guided by an interactive decision-aiding system towards 
the search engines that will provide answers: this is about optimising consumer 
choice; a third example is to be found in the service provided by music or film 
platforms:  many of us are very grateful to platform operators for guiding us 
towards music matching our tastes that we did not know even existed; finally, 
                                                          
28 We all know the criticisms of the profiling instinctively carried out by a corporate manager who has to recruit 
an employee or decide on a promotion.  Human subjectivity, a bad mood, suspicions of a stitch-up and a lack of 
quality and quantity of data serving as the basis for their decision will all be sources of doubt hanging over the 
decision in the eyes of some.  Inversely, there is little to criticise in a decision proposed or provided by a machine 
having worked on plentiful data that appear to be objective (handwriting samples, statistics on a given category 
of candidates in relation to their studies and curricula vitae, their behaviour during the interview analysed by 
facial recognition systems etc) and applied without discrimination to all candidates.  The neutrality of the 
workings of the information system, the volume of the data processed and the apparent objectivity are obvious 
advantages in replacing human assessment with a digital one. 
29 Regarding the use of automated profiling systems in 11 countries of the European Union, see the report: 
Automating Society Taking Stock of Automated Decision-Making in the EU: A report by AlgorithmWatch in 






in the area of employment policy, public authorities are able to define desirable 
job profiles and study specialisations, in relation to multiple criteria reflecting 
the local community, the local economy's current and future needs and 
numerous other aspects, while pinpointing shortages or surpluses of trainees 
in the different disciplines.  In addition, when made available, the results of this 
profiling will also be of interest to members of the public who will be able to 
select their training and orient their job applications in line with demand.   
 
3. … and risks - These advantages of automated profiling are to be weighed against risks 
whose seriousness is to be gauged in terms of the consequences and impact of the 
profiling decisions entrusted to digital systems.  The dangers of profiling are to be 
measured against the purpose sought or discovered by the person setting it up. It must 
be emphasised that profiling is not just one end in itself but may correspond to a 
multitude of purposes: medical research, targeting clientele for marketing, framing 
public strategies, combating fraud or preventing crime etc. That said, because of their 
characteristics, profiling operations carried out within the framework of machine 
learning information systems generally carry risks inherent in these methods.  
 
• The first of these is that a large amount of the data gathered is processed out 
of context.In one example involving the hiring of an employee, a system 
excluding all graduates who took more than five years to complete their 
master's degree would rule out a candidate having taken seven years to 
complete their studies owing to a health problem.  
• The second is that the algorithm may present errors either in its design or in 
the data used which may be false or of poor quality or a poor match for the 





a degree of bias30 yielding misleading results or resulting in discrimination 
against certain individuals31 or even groups. 
• The third is undeniably the fear of ‘Deus ex machina’, ie the trust given a priori 
to the results of the algorithm. Human judgement, though subjective, can be 
revised and above all contradicted by other human judgements.  One could 
certainly argue that it would be sufficient to reserve the ultimate say for human 
judgement and, with it, the possibility of revising the ‘truth spoken by the 
machine’.  We will come back to this point but we should note that this 
possibility of review does not always exist and the decision ‘suggested’ by the 
computer bears a strong presumption of truth, owing to the qualities of 
objectivity and neutrality that are acknowledged in or rather attributed to the 
workings of the information system generating the decision and, therefore, 
failure to follow the computer's ‘suggestion’ risks being regarded as an error 
and, frequently, proof of unacceptable subjectivity on the part of the person 
not going along with the ‘suggestion’.  Using such systems, as the GDPR notes 
in its recitals, incites a real abdication of responsibility by the decision-maker. 
Finally, this manner of taking decisions32, with no possibility for the individual 
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31 Still on the subject of employee recruitment (see previous note), in this case a computer scientist, taking the 
gender of top IT specialists into account is a bias: one only has to look at the number of female IT computer 
scientists to see why there are few people who have the expertise expected 
32 As the preparatory work for the RGPD shows, the European legislator concluded that there was cause for 





to be heard and, sometimes, understand the reasons for the decision taken in 
their respect, may in some cases be seen as a violation of human dignity, 
reducing the individual to a mere subject of a calculation.  
 
4. Initial thoughts on the role of the law – This brings us to the points targeted by 
regulatory intervention to correct the risks of digital profiling.  Firstly, this entails 
recognising processing involving profiling as such, defining it.  Then it is a matter, when 
automated profiling systems are designed, of requiring a proper assessment of the 
risks for those concerned, the risks linked to such processing weighed against the 
advantages that these systems can offer both for the data subject and for the data 
controller.  In some cases, this weighing up of factors may require a real 
multidisciplinary debate that is open to consideration of the different interests at 
stake. Finally, data subjects must have the option, as they used to have, of challenging 
the ‘truths coming from the computer’.  Accordingly, such regulation suggests that 
there should be a distinction between different types of profiling which carry differing 
risks depending on the purposes sought.  We will come back to this after looking at the 
definitions used in various European texts.   
 
5. Definitions - The GDPR defines profiling in Article 4 (4) as follows: "'profiling' means 
any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal 
data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to 
analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, 
economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, 
location or movements." Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data uses the same definition 
in its Article 3(4).  
 
This definition does not deviate from the one proposed in Recommendation CM Rec 
(2010) 13.  It should be noted however that the latter recommendation distinguished 
the notion of profile, resulting from an algorithm capable of serving multiple purposes 
and being applied to numerous individuals. For example, the fraud suspect ‘category’ 
focuses on the abstract characteristics theoretically presented by individuals who may 
have committed such a crime) while the profiling aspect designates, within an 
application pursuing a defined purpose, the application of the profile. "‘Profile’ refers to 
a set of data characterising a category of individuals that is intended to be applied to an 
individual".  The term ‘profiling’ in the Council of Europe recommendation hinged on 
the term ‘profile’: "profiling" means an automatic data processing technique that 
consists of applying a “profile” to an individual, particularly in order to take decisions 
concerning her or him or for analysing or predicting her or his personal preferences, 
                                                          
provision is designed to protect the interest of the data subject in participating in the making of decisions which 
are of importance to him. The use of extensive data profiles of individuals by powerful public and private 
institutions deprives the individual of the capacity to influence decision-making processes within those 





behaviours and attitudes".  Must the notion of profile be maintained whereas it is 
dropped by the more recent European texts?  
 
The term ‘profile’ was and still is meaningful in systems which distinguish operations 
creating profiles from those that apply them, as would be the case in the definition of an 
ideal employee profile or a potential criminal.  On the other hand, it becomes irrelevant 
when the functioning of the algorithm no longer allows a distinction between these two 
phases, as it results directly in an ‘action’ in relation to an individual (such as the sending 
of one-to-one marketing material advertising a product or service).  In other words, 
highlighting the ‘profile’ allows transparency of the criteria to be applied in a second 
phase by the profiling operation.  It also helps to flag up discrimination, which is no 
longer against individuals but at group level, as it is all the people corresponding to a 
given category who risk being on the receiving end of a negative evaluation.  One could 
imagine a district presenting a profile of one that is dangerous being systematically 
stigmatised during operations to track down a criminal or a district merely presenting 
a profile of widespread illiteracy, where the residents would automatically be assigned 
a negative coefficient when candidates for jobs were assessed. 
 
In the light of our analysis of the functioning of artificial intelligence systems, we prefer 
when discussing such systems to use the term ‘model’ rather than ‘profile’.  A model 
is a mathematical abstraction providing a simplified description of data to resolve the 
task at hand, ie the formula with the best parameter values for the solution.  A model 
is not fixed but evolves as it encounters more data. It reflects the fact that profiling, 
which uses automated learning methods, does not function through causalism which 
deduces or claims to deduce a rule formulated by experts to establish that a given 
person belongs to a given category but rather on the basis of purely statistical and 
evolutive correlation between data.  The pattern followed in the case of artificial 
intelligence is not causal explanation but purely statistical findings.  
 
6. Generic purposes of profiling: detecting and foreseeing – But beyond that, how are 
these definitions to be understood? The definitions distinguish two generic purposes 
of profiling: analysis and prevention. This entails both describing the past in order to 
understand it and predicting a person's future behaviour. These two purposes are not 
mutually exclusive. The distinction is clear, for example, when we look at processing 
carried out by the police: it is one thing for profiling to use past events, such as a crime, 
to look for a potential culprit (factoring in the place of the crime, the presence of given 
clues, how the crime was carried out etc) – this is reactive profiling used to establish 
the profile of the criminal in terms of a whole host of criteria including the analysis of 
more or less similar precedents.  It is quite another thing, though, to analyse the risks 
of a prisoner reoffending or anticipating a terrorist attack and potential perpetrators, 
where a forward-looking proactive analysis will yield predictions of the behaviour of 
identified or identifiable individuals.  That said, the distinction between these two 
types of profiling is far from black and white.  Obviously, analysing an individual's past 
may end up pointing to their behaviour in the future.    
 
7. Profiling beyond personal data - The definition of profiling in European Union texts 





controller relate only to these data. It is noteworthy that the consultative committee 
of Convention 108 guidelines in respect of Big Data broadens this area of concern. It 
refers to operations involving data regardless of whether or not they are personal.  This 
is an important point as most of the Big Data on which systems using artificial 
intelligence for profiling are run bring together both anonymous and personal data.  
Some are statistical data (for instance, in a database used by the police authorities, 
statistics on different types of crime by urban sector will be used).  Indeed, is the 
distinction between anonymous and personal still meaningful now that data classified 
as anonymous can now sometimes be ‘deanonymised’?  Furthermore, these 
"anonymous" data are important in most profiling operations, and limiting the 
obligations of the controller, such as the obligation of information, to personal data 
alone creates a risk, in our opinion, of having an incomplete view of how profiling-
oriented processing works. We will come back to this major concern.  
 
8. The 2010 recommendation: an avant-garde text – The Council of Europe's 
recommendation dates from 2010, just under ten years ago.  At the time it was hailed 
as an avant-garde text.  The recommendation explains the importance subsequently 
attached to profiling-related processing by the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and it should be noted, in particular, how the points are reiterated 
in that Regulation, including the controller's obligation to inform the data subject of 
the ‘logic underpinning the processing’, to use the terms of the Recommendation or 
the necessity of a Risk assessment.  
 
So why consider a new recommendation?  There are various arguments in favour. 
Ambient intelligence (the Internet of things - IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI), which 
are the tools of profiling now and even more so in the future, were little used by the 
‘profilers’ of ten years ago.  These two innovations were seen as disruptive as they 
profoundly modified our environment and our relation to it, creating new risks not only 
for the individual but also for the functioning of our society as such.  The Convetion 
108 Committee addressed those risks by drawing up two  key documents, one of them 
being guidelines focusing on the phenomenon of Big Data and the other on AI.  It is 
important, therefore, to take these new risks into account (I) but also the new ideas 
introduced by the recommendations we have just mentioned (II).  
 
I. The risks posed to our individual freedoms and the other risks linked 
to profiling in the context of the disruptive innovations of AI and the 
IoT  
 
9.  The notion of ‘risk’ is central in the Council of Europe Convention and the ensuing 
Report (see for example and in particular, paragraph 90) but we still have to establish 
what risks we are talking about.  First we will look at those relating to the dangers to 
our individual freedoms and then go on to analyse other collective risks faced by 
society and its democratic functioning, risks emphasised by the Convention 108 






A.  The risks posed to our individual freedoms  
–  
10. Individual freedoms – going beyond data protection – It should be noted to begin 
with that the notion of ‘individual freedoms’ does not stop at the right to data 
protection but should extend to all individual freedoms that could be jeopardised by 
profiling.  The Council of Europe and the European Union agree on this point: “As 
indicated in the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Statement on the role of a 
risk-based approach in data protection legal frameworks, the reference to “the rights 
and freedoms” of data subjects primarily concerns the rights to data protection and 
privacy but may also involve other fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, 
freedom of thought, freedom of movement, prohibition of discrimination, right to 
liberty, conscience and religion.” (Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment 
(DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the 
purposes of Regulation 2016/679 Adopted on 4 April 2017)”.  
 
11. Risks for individual freedoms – While not an exhaustive list, some of the risks for our 
individual freedoms are as follows:  
 
• The risk of reductionism – It is proving increasingly easy to gather data, as the 
sources are multiplied by omnipresent technology, storage costs have plunged and 
transmission capacities facilitate access to the data reservoirs formed or their 
concentration. All this explains the multiplication of Big Data and the possibilities 
of their use by artificial intelligence systems.  Within these data warehouses, 
individuals are focused on, not as persons but through the aggregation of a certain 
amount of data concerning them, all regarded as little pieces of ‘truth’ about each 
and every one of us in that they represent snapshots of our lives (my presence in a 
given place, my surfing, the hours I keep and my ‘listener objects’, my purchase of 
a given product, my energy consumption) and also through the correlation of data 
like this with similar data collected from other individuals or anonymous data 
specific to the entities or groups to which I belong.  The truths reflected by data 
grabbed from life events are further compounded by statistics.  It is difficult to deny 
that someone might be a con-man, the perfect candidate or a person attracted by 
certain advertising or a political party if their ‘profile’ or rather the ‘model’ used 
shows that 95% of people with the same profile have the same potential or 
inclinations.  In short, in this alchemy of algorithms, the individual becomes an 
aggregate of data taken out of context and is reduced to being nothing more33.  
 
This reality prompts two observations.  The first is that the information systems 
that profile us and, where applicable, decide34 on a given course of action in our 
respect perceive us and judge our personalities only through such data and 
correlations over which there is not always full control. We are recognised through 
                                                          
33 Specifically regarding the danger of reducing human beings to nothing more than genetic data, read article 2.b 
of UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (11 November 1997): "That dignity 
makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic characteristics and to respect their uniqueness and 
diversity." 
34 Obviously, the system does not decide as such but is the agent to which humans (a corporation, a public body) 





"profiles" or "models" shaped by expert systems and ‘artificial’ intelligence systems 
and with an eye to the purposes defined by the people who use these data, 
doubtless without the slightest regard for human dignity.  The second concern is 
that the galloping automation of decision-making processes engenders a pretty 
well automatic acceptance of the validity and pertinence of those decisions and, in 
turn, a disengagement and sidestepping of responsibility by "human" decision-
makers. 
 
• The risk of taking data out of context - Respecting "contexts", ie the areas of trust 
in which a piece of personal data is transmitted by the data subject, is fundamental 
in our societies.  Use of the same platforms in our various activities (the same social 
network, for example, the same search engine etc) and the presence of certain 
platform operators in various activities through their branches, notably the big five 
(GAFAM - it is noteworthy that these players operate not as competitors but in 
complementary markets even though they all live off the exploitation of the data 
they gather through their platforms and the associated services35, enabling them 
to cross-reference the data transmitted in different contexts) break down the 
boundaries which individuals wish or may wish to lay down between the different 
‘areas of their lives’.  
 
• The risk of stigmatisation – Computer memory is or at least seems unlimited, going 
well beyond the capabilities of human memory.  It keeps a trace of our past or of 
certain events in our past which we would sometimes prefer to forget.  This 
computer memory which is so useful for processing in the area of profiling risks 
stigmatising an individual for their entire life.  An insurer could keep the trace of a 
customer's illness indefinitely; a bank could keep a note of a bounced cheque; an 
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Economic power of the GAFAM (Source: Wikipedia, v° GAFAM, 2018) 
Corporation Founded Flagship products 
Main source of 
income (in 2017)15 
Users16(billions) 
Market capitalisation17 (billions of USD 
in March 2018) 
Major acquisitions 
Google(Alphabet) 1998 
Search engine, Advertising, 
Artificial intelligence 
Advertising (86%) 1.42 719 reCAPTCHA, Waze, DoubleClick, YouTube, Android 
Apple 1976 PCs Hardware (81%) 0.85 851Note 1 Beats Electronics 
Facebook 2005 
Réseau social, Advertising, 
Artificial intelligence  
Advertising (98%) 2.13 464 Instagram, WhatsApp, Oculus 
Amazon 1994 E-commerce , cloud computing On-line sales (82%) 0.244 701 Whole Foods Market 
Microsoft 1975 
Operating system, cloud 
computing 






employers' association could keep records of a theft previously committed by a 
jobseeker or of someone being expelled from or dropping out of school.  Is allowing 
for a person's ability to change and not freezeframing them in their past not an 
ethical requirement?  
 
• The risk of the disintegration of the private sphere and the risk of unlimited 
surveillance -  The fact that technology is everywhere makes individuals 
transparent as they are increasingly unable to live unconnected to the tools and 
services of digital society.  Their transparency is total, or otherwise partial in the 
event of them going without some of the services offered by technology or 
disconnecting.  As we have seen, technology records not only the traces voluntarily 
left36 by an individual on a social network or sites providing services37, and not only 
their movements and motion as well as facial expressions and choices of services, 
products or information (surfing).  Using the data captured through AI systems and 
also affective computing, this technology is designed to know or rather guess or 
predict our emotions and sentiments and, through the examination of our genetic 
data, our ‘identity’. The deletion within our tech-driven society of the distinction 
between public sphere and private sphere is a worrying development:  the 
distinction between the two, which was a mainstay of our right guaranteeing the 
inviolability of our home, as opposed to the public sphere, has now been done 
away with. The protection of one's physical abode as inviolable was traditionally 
viewed, and by the law too, as something that was fundamental for the 
construction of an individual's personality. The notion of the home, a place where 
we could be free and out of others' sight, has also been turned upside down by 
technological developments that are driving the abolition of the distinction 
between public and private spheres.  
  
• The risk of ‘normalisation’ linked to the opaqueness of information systems – In 
contrast to the transparency of individuals, the information systems engineering 
that transparency are often not transparent at all.  Their opaqueness lies firstly in 
the functioning of both terminals (notably cookies and the RFIDs present in the 
Internet of things) and infrastructures (see the "distributed agents" located 
throughout information systems such as ambient intelligence systems).  This lack 
of transparency engenders fears of unsolicited and unwanted processing and 
therefore a desire to conform to what we imagine is the behaviour expected by 
these new and invisible "places" of surveillance.  The dangers and threats 
stemming from the opaque nature of our information societies where citizens 
cannot exactly know how information systems function, what data are collected, 
                                                          
36 Voluntarily but often without being aware of the possibilities opened up for the use of the data confided to 
the network.  
37 A recent survey by TECHCRUNCH, a media company specialising in the analysis of digital technology, revealed 
that "the Israeli company Glassbox records everything you do on your telephone when you use a site or 
application run by one of its clients. This analytics company tries to gain a better understanding of consumers' 
behaviour and how they navigate in certain applications. Hotels.com, Expedia, Abercombie & Fitch and a great 
many others use Glassbox to record everything their customers do when using their application, every single 






where they are processed or what the intentions are of those processing them, 
were already highlighted in 1983 by the famous German Constitutional Court 
judgment in the case of the revised Census Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof 15 
December 1983, EuGRZ, 1983, p.171 ff.). Faced with these opaque systems, citizens 
are often inclined to adopt the  behaviour they imagine society expects and would 
not dare to express themselves freely, which is harmful for the functioning of our 
democracies. Furthermore, our life on networks is exposed by the functioning of 
tools which, in one way or another, formats our knowledge of and approach to the 
real world and our actions and interactions with others. Our search engines suggest 
– and we should realise how lucky we are that they do – a ranking of sites in 
response to our searches and Facebook decides on the priority information we 
receive.  
 
In short, AI systems help to insidiously set the ‘norms’ for our behaviour38 not by 
imposing them but, in a more subtle manner, by proposing them as the obvious 
way to make life easier: "simply click". These systems operate along the lines of 
what some call "libertarian capitalism". In these systems, the norm is not 
mandatory but it is suggested that users comply with it; it does not operate 
transparently but behind the mask of a piece of advice which is presented as 
meeting your needs39. You do not know how that advice is produced other than it 
is conjured up by the systems which you ‘consent’ to use … and data, taken from 
others as well as unknown data that are deemed relevant by the designer and in 
any case by the system. 
 
• The risk of manipulation – The opaque nature of systems' functioning has another  
consequence: the risk of manipulation, and all the more so as artificial intelligence 
paves the way for what our colleague A. Rouvroy (2014) calls "algorithmic 
governmentality". As we have already emphasised, the profiles created constitute 
tools for analysing not only the past but also the ‘truth’ that these profiles claim to 
reflect, which, it has to be said, is purely statistical and not exempt from bias. So 
these profiles are valuable as a means of predicting future behaviour40.  
 
                                                          
38 “They beckon with seductive appeal. Individual citizen-consumers willingly and actively participate in 
processes of modulation, seeking the benefits that increased personalization can bring. For favoured consumers, 
these may include price discounts, enhanced products and services, more convenient access to resources, and 
heightened social status. Within surveillant assemblages, patterns of information flow are accompanied by 
discourses about why the patterns are natural and beneficial, and those discourses foster widespread 
internalization of the new norms of information flow. For all of these reasons, a critique of surveillance as privacy 
invasion “does not do justice to the productive character of consumer surveillance.”. Modulation is a mode of 
privacy invasion, but it is also a mode of knowledge production designed to produce a particular way of knowing 
and a mode of governance designed to produce a particular kind of subject. Its purpose is to produce tractable, 
predictable citizen-consumers whose preferred modes of self-determination play out along predictable and profit-
generating trajectories. Yet to speak of networked processes of surveillance and modulation in the industrial-era 
vernacular, as systems for “manufacturing consent” would be too crude”. ( J.COHEN, “What Privacy is For?”, 
126 Harvard Law Journal, 2013, (draft of 11 May 2012, p. 12)) 
39 ‘Recommendation’ algorithms used by Facebook for example regarding news items that will interest users.  
40 The boss of Amazon has claimed that "even before you have placed your order, we have prepared your 
package" and the boss of Google has added: "It will become very difficult for people to see or consume something 





We can see one obvious sign of this manipulation in what are called nudges41: the 
systems suggest to a driver the best route to take; to a researcher how their H-
index might develop; to the head of a municipality the unsafe or no-go areas where 
policing is required; to a minister of education or a teacher the criteria whereby, in 
theory, children could succeed at school; to judges the risks of a perpetrator 
reoffending or the ruling most closely in keeping with the law or rather what has 
already been ruled as such; to a reader the books that they are bound to enjoy.  
 
To consumers, the computer sends targeted advertising of products or services 
that are supposed to match your tastes. Is this manipulation reprehensible? Of 
course not. Salesmen have always practised ‘bonus dolus’ without this being 
thought reprehensible. It might even be seen as a benefit for future ‘customers’ by 
giving them more information, enabling them to discover new products or services 
or even meeting their need for guidance in a market that is ever more complex 
with an ever wider range of products. Manipulation is reprehensible only if it 
represents an ‘abuse of circumstances’ to borrow the term from the draft Belgian 
legislation42 which defines this notion as follows: "manifest imbalance between the 
services provided as a result of one party abusing the circumstances linked to the 
position of weakness of the other party"43.  This manipulation is punishable if it 
constitutes an "abuse of the weakness of others", according to the Belgian criminal 
law of 26 November44. The risk of ‘abusive’ manipulation may be greater when 
minors, the elderly or disabled persons are involved, but this extension of the law, 
albeit a vague one, is prompted by the necessity of taking account of the 
vulnerability of each and every person in our modern society. As for the situations 
where this risk of manipulation will be applicable, one has the distinct feeling that 
it will all depend on a ‘Risk assessment’ weighing up the interests of each 
protagonist.   
 
Such manipulation can have far greater ramifications when a profiling system is 
used for political ends, in order to target voters with the ‘right message’ which will 
end up convincing them to vote for a given cause. The ‘Cambridge Analytica’ 
scandal shows that this is possible. Here, the risk is not so much individual as 
collective in that it touches on our notion of democracy.  
                                                          
41 "Nudge theory (or libertarian paternalism theory), as Wikipedia explains, is a concept in behavioural science, 
political theory and economics drawn from industrial design practices, which argues that indirect suggestions 
can gently influence the motivation, incentives and decision-making of groups and individuals, at least as 
effectively if not more than a direct instruction, legislation or implementation. " 
42 Belgium's current reform of contract law enshrines this concept, in article 5.41 of the draft Code of obligations.  
43 Regarding this provision, its origin and commentaries on it, see the thoughts of H. JACQUEMIN, "Protection du 
consommateur et numérique en droits européen et belge", in Vunérabilités et droits dans l’environnement 
numérique, Proceedings of the colloquy held in Namur on 14 October 2018, coordinated by H. JACQUEMIN and 
M. NIHOUL, Larcier, Collection de la faculté de droit de Namur, p. 241 ff; in the same publication, see also F. 
GEORGE and J.B. HUBIN, "La protection de la personne en droit des obligations", p. 67 ff.  
44 The law of 26 November 2011 introduces, into the Belgian Criminal Code, the notion of abusing another 
person's situation of weakness. On 7 November 2013, when addressing the complaint brought by some against 
the vagueness of this legislation, perceived by them as disregarding the principle of ‘predictability’ of criminal 
law, the Constitutional Court  justified the extension as follows: "in a democratic society, the protection of people 







• The risk of dehumanisation –  The ability to reason and take decisions for oneself 
that men could entrust to machines could result in replacing human reasoning 
forged by dialogue and consideration of others with an automated mechanism, and 
this gives rise to major ethical concerns. As can be seen from preparatory work, 
Europe's law-makers have indeed become worried about this kind of automation 
and the reduced role played by people and, ultimately, the human being. It has 
been a question of counter-balancing the risks of human decision-making with 
everything that comes with it - admittedly subjectivity, over-empathising and poor 
judgment in the decision process but also the advantages of human decision-
making, with its possibilities of correction, dialogue and giving reasons. A further 
concern is the fact that the galloping automation of decision-making processes is 
engendering quasi-automatic acceptance of those decisions as valid and pertinent 
and, in turn, a divestment and abdication of responsibility by "human" decision-
makers45.  
 
• The risk of discrimination - Finally, the possibility of automated reasoning being 
tainted by what is conventionally known as bias has long been argued. This bias, 
whether deliberate or not, may result in discrimination. The excessive weighting 
given to one criterion, the fact that such a criterion may conceal another criterion 
discriminating against a category of the community (black people, women, 
foreigners, disabled persons, poor people etc) and to a degree that goes far beyond 
the criteria linked to the categories of sensitive or special data set out in the 
relevant article of Convention 108+, the refusal to take into consideration a 
contextual element specific to the data subject, making them a victim of the 
computer's automaticity, all constitute a final risk both individually, and, where 
applicable, to an entire group and therefore collectively: an AI system's analysis of 
districts likely to harbour criminals casts aspersions not only, in individual terms, 
on the actual people living in that district but also on the district itself and its image 
and would trigger social consequences (people deserting the district or refusing to 
go and live there) or possibly increased police surveillance. Therefore, this is very 
much a risk. The risk of discrimination is exacerbated by the fact that the 
functioning of the decision-making mechanism appears to be neutral and objective 
and the opaque nature of that functioning prevents the deciphering of the so-
called ‘logic’ followed.   
 
B. The "collective" risks and "mutual stakeholder" risks  
 
12. Are individual risks the only ones involved? Many of the risks mentioned above 
(discrimination, stigmatisation etc) undermine not only the freedoms of every 
individual as such but also those of groups, be they ethnic, philosophical, low-income, 
district residents etc. Processing of this kind affects other values, particularly social 
                                                          
45 In this connection, the European Commission's AI experts pointed out that "the results produced by the 
machine, using more and more sophisticated software, and even expert system, has an apparently objective and 






justice or cultural diversity among individuals or among groups46 and, beyond that and 
sometimes substantially, the functioning of our societies and our democracies in 
particular. The abusive manipulation of individuals undermines both freedoms and 
human dignity in the Kantian sense of the term47 but while it is a danger to each and 
every one of us in this respect, it may also affect an entire population or have blanket 
effects by shaping the political views of citizens for example. Personalising offers of 
services and excluding certain individuals from the potential benefits of those services 
has ramifications beyond individuals and impacts groups of people, raising questions 
of social justice.  
 
Another thought: by definition, Big Data drag us all into a shared adventure. When my 
surfing data are gathered by my favourite search engine and swallowed up by a vast 
database together with millions of data items relating to the choices of other web  
users, the model that will at some point take a decision regarding me, will clearly do 
so in relation to all the data gathered and differentiation induced by algorithmic 
searches between my data and those of others. There is also a domino effect whereby 
a person's choice to log on to a social network for example will ultimately have a major 
influence on the choices of their friends and family.  
 
Let us take the example of ‘one-to-one’ insurances for health care or civil liability: 
personalising premiums to obtain the closest possible match to the ‘risks’ that each 
individual may present, risks calculated on the basis of their profile, puts the sacrosanct 
principle of risk-sharing, a mainstay of our insurance system, under huge strain. It is 
quite remarkable that traditional data protection or privacy issues, in the narrow sense 
of the term, are transcended in this way. We could say the same thing of an artificial 
intelligence system intended to predict the chances of children doing well at school or 
the risks of domestic violence against children within the population that would give 
weightings to certain data. The risk posed by this identification is not just individual 
but collective too, as there is a danger of stigmatising certain types of communities. 
The necessity of broadening the concerns of Convention 108 is rightly emphasised in 
the recent guidelines we have already cited, on Big Data and artificial intelligence. 
Moreover, while this broadening of the spectrum of risks to be taken into account is 
not to be found in the European Union's texts, it is present in the recommendations of 
the OECD adopted a short time ago by the Ministerial Council in May 2019 : “AI actors 
should respect the rule of law, human rights and democratic values, 
throughout the AI system lifecycle. These include freedom, dignity and 
autonomy, privacy and data protection, non-discrimination and equality, 
diversity, fairness, social justice, and internationally recogni sed labour 
rights”. This point is of major importance and raises the question of whether 
it is possible to combat these risks to collective groups and mutual 
stakeholders via the data protection texts and the bodies created by such 
legislation.  Are the scope of those texts and the competence of those bodies 
not limited to solely protecting against individual risks? We will come back 
                                                          
46 Cf. UNESCO's 2003 Declaration on bioethics: "No individual or group should be discriminated against or 
stigmatized on any grounds, in violation of human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms." 
47 According to Kantian doctrine which is widely accepted in our European countries, dignity means that human 





to this important point, which must be taken into account by our 
recommendations48. 
 
II.  The texts of the European Union and the Council of Europe 
 
13. Introduction – We will limit ourselves here to listing the provisions of the European 
texts and adding a brief comment on how the Council's recent instruments (guidelines 
adopted by the Convention 108 Committee) point out the necessity of broadening the 
debate, which is particularly called for where profiling-related processing is concerned.  
  
14. The GDPR and Directive 206/680 – In the texts of the European Union, the question 
of profiling is broached by various provisions. We have already cited the definition 
given by Article 4 (4) of the GDPR or Article 3 (4) of Directive 2016/680 on processing 
used in police work. In addition, Articles 13. 2 (f) and 14. 2 (g) of the GDPR49 mention 
among the information to be provided to the data subject: ‘the existence of automated 
decision-making, including profiling … and, at least in those cases, meaningful 
information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged 
consequences of such processing for the data subject’. Article 15.1 (h) stipulates access 
to the same information. Article 22. 1, under the heading: ‘Automated individual 
decision-making, including profiling’, entitles the data subject to refuse to be subjected 
to this type of processing if it produces legal effects concerning them or similarly 
‘significantly affects’ them except in the cases provided for in paragraph 2, namely if it 
is necessary for entering into a contract or if it is authorised by law or by explicit 
consent. Where such exceptions apply, Article 22.3 obliges the controller to 
‘implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and 
legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the 
controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision’. Article 35 
concerns the controller's obligation to carry out an ‘assessment of the impact’ of the 
envisaged processing operations where it is likely to result in a ‘high risk’ for the data 
subjects.  Paragraph 3 of this article makes this analysis a particular requirement ‘in 
the case of a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to 
natural persons which is based on automated processing, including profiling’, when 
decisions based on that evaluation produce legal effects on the data subjects or 
significantly affect them. Furthermore, on 3 October 2017, with a view to the then 
forthcoming application of the GDPR, the so-called Article 29 Working Party issued 
‘Guidelines on automated decision making and Profiling’, intended to interpret the 
Regulation's various provisions. These very substantial ‘Guidelines’ were taken on 
board by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) set up since then under the 
Regulation, which has inherited the Article 29 Working Party's prerogatives, among 
                                                          
48 As far as we know, only the recent report by S. DREYER and W. SCHULTZ ("The GDPR and automated decision 
making : Will it deliver?", Bertelsman Foundation Report, January 2019, available from the Bertelsmann 
foundation site) looks at this question.   
49 We will not go into the provisions of the text of the directive on processing used in police work in detail here. 
In the main, they follow those of the Regulation. We will come back to this text when discussing profiling carried 





others. We will be looking at a few points of interpretation of the GDPR text featuring 
in those ‘Guidelines’. 
 
Moreover, Directive 2016/680, in this case applicable to the processing of data in the 
area of criminal offences or penalties, on top of reiterating in Article 11 the principle 
of the inadequacy of automated individual decision-making enshrined in Article 22, 
adds in paragraph 3 that " Profiling that results in discrimination against natural 
persons on the basis of special categories of personal data … shall be prohibited, …"  
15. And Convention 108+ ?- The text of Convention 108+ neither mentions nor foresees 
processing such as profiling. However, we should emphasise Article 9.1 regarding 
automated decisions (to be compared with Article 22 of the GDPR) : "Every individual 
shall have a right: a. not to be subject to a decision significantly affecting him or her 
based solely on an automated processing of data without having his or her views taken 
into consideration". The importance of an approach geared to risks is emphasised by 
Article 10, where paragraph 2 stipulates: "Each Party shall provide that controllers and, 
where applicable, processors, examine the likely impact of intended data processing on 
the rights and fundamental freedoms of data subjects prior to the commencement of 
such processing, and shall design the data processing in such a manner as to prevent 
or minimise the risk of interference with those rights and fundamental freedoms." and 
paragraph 4 allows each State to adopt complementary measures (see also Article 13): 
"Each Party may, having regard to the risks arising for the interests, rights and 
fundamental freedoms of the data subjects, adapt the application of the provisions of 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 in the law giving effect to the provisions of this Convention, 
according to the nature and volume of the data, the nature, scope and purpose of the 
processing and, where appropriate, the size of the controller or processor".  
 
16. Broadening of the scope by the Guidelines on Big Data and AI What seems more 
significant to us are the broader dimensions asserted by the Council guidelines which 
cover various aspects and must be taken into account when writing any new 
instrument on profiling, and all the more so in the knowledge that profiling is now 
increasingly reliant on the resources provided by Big Data and the potential offered by 
artificial  intelligence:  
 
a. These first of these has already been mentioned: the two guidelines very much 
set the tone for the debate by taking account of other ethical aspects such as 
dignity, social justice and non-discrimination, cultural diversity and the joint 





individual data protection50. The "Guidelines on Big Data” of 23 January 201751 
do not hesitate to spell this out: "Since the use of Big Data may affect not only 
individual privacy and data protection, but also the collective dimension of 
these rights, preventive policies and risk-assessment shall consider the legal, 
social and ethical impact of the use of Big Data, including with regard to the 
right to equal treatment and to non-discrimination”. And the general guidance 
highlighted in the Guidelines on AI follow the same direction: "The protection 
of human dignity and safeguarding of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, are essential 
when developing and adopting AI applications that may have consequences on 
individuals and society. This is especially important when AI applications are 
used in decision-making processes.". 
 
b. The second involves broadening the circle of players whose role entails certain 
obligations. While the GDPR and Convention 108+ mention only the obligations 
of the "controller" of the processing, the two guidelines incorporate the 
responsibility of other players involved either in the supply of the Big Data or 
libraries to be used by profiling systems or in the design and implementation 
of the base algorithms or the tailoring of those algorithms to the particular 
needs of a given sector or system52. This concern comes as no surprise as, when 
we look at the players' involvement, it is clear that the characteristics of the 
processing and the extent of the associated risks are far from depending merely 
on the controller and are in fact the result of the choice of the data often 
acquired outside (data supplier) and the choice of base algorithm or algorithm 
                                                          
50 See, along the same lines: “AI systems should not harm human beings. By design, AI systems should protect the 
dignity, integrity, liberty, privacy, safety, and security of human beings in society and at work. AI systems should 
not threaten the democratic process, freedom of expression, freedoms of identify, or the possibility to refuse AI 
services. At the very least, AI systems should not be designed in a way that enhances existing harms or creates 
new harms for individuals. Harms can be physical, psychological, financial or social. AI specific harms may stem 
from the treatment of data on individuals (i.e. how it is collected, stored, used, etc.). To avoid harm, data collected 
and used for training of AI algorithms must be done in a way that avoids discrimination, manipulation, or negative 
profiling. Of equal importance, AI systems should be developed and implemented in a way that protects societies 
from ideological polarization and algorithmic determinism.” High Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence in 
its Ethical Guidelines for a Trustworthy AI (2019). 
51 See also "Personal data processing should not be in conflict with the ethical values commonly accepted in the 
relevant community or communities and should not prejudice societal interests, values and norms, including the 
protection of human rights. …" 
52  Guidelines on AI: "1. AI developers, manufacturers and service providers should adopt a values-oriented 
approach in the design of their products and services, consistent with Convention 108+, in particular with article 
10.2, and other relevant instruments of the Council of Europe.  
2. AI developers, manufacturers and service providers should assess the possible adverse consequences of AI 
applications on human rights and fundamental freedoms, and, considering these consequences, adopt a 
precautionary approach based on appropriate risk prevention and mitigation measures.  
3. In all phases of the processing, including data collection, AI developers, manufacturers and service providers 
should adopt a human rights by-design approach and avoid any potential biases, including unintentional or 
hidden, and the risk of discrimination or other adverse impacts on the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of data subjects.  
4. AI developers should critically assess the quality, nature, origin and amount of personal data used, reducing 
unnecessary, redundant or marginal data during the development, and training phases and then monitoring the 
model’s accuracy as it is fed with new data. The use of synthetic data may be considered as one possible solution 





tailored by a third party to the needs of the controller's specific application 
(developers and manufacturers, to use the terms employed by the Guidelines 
on AI)53. Finally, can it not be stipulated, as advocated by the 2010 
Recommendation (Section 3.8.) that: "The distribution and use, without the 
data subject’s knowledge, of software aimed at the observation or the 
monitoring in the context of profiling of the use being made of a given terminal 
or electronic communication network should be permitted only if they are 
expressly provided for by domestic law and accompanied by appropriate 
safeguards”? 
 
c. The third point to look at is greater emphasis on the risk-oriented approach.  
Both guidelines call for prior and full identification of the risks to both 
individuals and society and for consideration of the different types of 
algorithms used: "The risk of adverse impacts on individuals and society due to 
de-contextualised data and de-contextualised algorithmic models should be 
adequately considered in developing and using AI applications", according to 
the Guidelines on AI). The Guidelines on Big Data are along similar lines, calling 
for preventive policies and various risk assessment measures. This approach 
ties in with the application of the precautionary principle, commonly used in 
environmental law. 
 
d. The fourth extends the environmental law approach, calling for a participatory, 
constructive, ‘multi-stakeholder’ and interdisciplinary assessment of the risks 
and solutions to be found. It advocates the creation, where applicable and 
depending on the extent of the risks envisaged, of an ethics committee 
(Guidelines on Big Data) : "If the assessment of the likely impact of an intended 
data processing described in Section IV.2 highlights a high impact of the use of 
Big Data on ethical values, controllers could establish an ad hoc ethics 
committee, or rely on existing ones, to identify the specific ethical values to be 
safeguarded in the use of data. The ethics committee should be an independent 
body composed by members selected for their competence, experience and 
professional qualities and performing their duties impartially and objectively."  
This point is echoed in the Guidelines on AI: "AI developers, manufacturers and 
service providers are encouraged to set up and consult independent committees 
of experts from a range of fields, as well as engage with independent academic 
institutions, which can contribute to designing human rights-based and 
ethically and socially-oriented AI applications, and to detecting potential bias. 
Such committees may play an especially important role in areas where 
                                                          
53 The same line of thought was taken by the Article 29 Group which, in the context of its ‘Guidelines on Data 
Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “ likely to result in a high risk ” for the 
purposes of Regulation 2016/679,” (adopted on 4 April 2017), writes: “ A DPIA can also be useful for assessing the 
data protection impact of a technology product, for example a piece of hardware or software, where this is likely 
to be used by different data controllers to carry out different processing operations. Of course, the data controller 
deploying the product remains obliged to carry out its own DPIA with regard to the specific implementation, but 
this can be informed by a DPIA prepared by the product provider, if appropriate. An example could be the 
relationship between manufacturers of smart meters and utility companies. Each product provider or processor 






transparency and stakeholder engagement can be more difficult due to 
competing interests and rights, such as in the fields of predictive justice, crime 
prevention and detection." and "Participatory forms of risk assessment, based 
on the active engagement of the individuals and groups potentially affected by 
AI applications, should be encouraged."  
 
 
Chapter II: Classification of profiling 
17. What criteria to use? – The “risk-based” approach highlighted by Council of Europe 
Convention 108+ and the two Guidelines suggests it is important to make the case for 
differentiated regulation, based on the degree of risk associated with the different 
types of processing. This degree of risk is in any case determined by reference firstly 
to the purpose of the profiling, secondly to the consequences it may have on the data 
subject or groups concerned and lastly, as has already been pointed out, to the 
processing method used. So, for example, profiling where the profiler uses only data 
that have been voluntarily provided by the consumer according to the precise needs 
of the service they desire will warrant a less tough approach than profiling where 
platforms make multi-purpose use of an ever-growing volume of data gleaned from 
the use of their services. 
 
Profiling is by no means a homogeneous category of processing activity, therefore. In 
this chapter, we will show that there are numerous sub-categories which present risks 
of varying kinds and significance. Examining the purposes for which profiling is used in 
practice provides an indication of these subcategories (I). The second criterion 
distinguishes processing operations according to the degree of risk involved: we talk 
about "high risk profiling” activities which we distinguish from other types of profiling 
in terms of the need for regulation (II). To conclude, we consider the possible 
implications of this dual classification (III).     
   
I. Classification by purpose  
18. Profiling – what’s it for? – Below we list a series of purposes according to the context 
of the profiling and look at how data protection instruments classify the different 
purposes of processing. For example, profiling might take place in a pre-contractual 
phase of the relationship between the controller and the data subject, or it might occur 
in the course of their contractual relationship. Profiling can be a service in itself which, 
whether fed with data from external sources or not, enables profiles to be supplied to 
third parties. Research, especially (although not exclusively) medical research, is 
another area where profiling is apt to be employed, or necessary. In the context of 
processing performed by public authorities, a further distinction will be made between 
various types of profiling depending on whether they are an aid to general decision-
making or whether they are performed for the purpose of applying rules and 
regulations in individual cases. Specific attention will be paid to profiling carried out by 
the police or judicial authorities for the purpose of crime prevention or detection. The 





profiling in other ways, such as by sector: direct marketing, administration, 
employment, banking, insurance, policing and justice.   
 
A. Profiling and the pre-contractual phase of the controller-data subject relationship.   
 
19. From targeted advertising to exclusion and adaptive pricing - Targeted advertising is 
probably the first application that springs to mind when it comes to profiling. In place 
of broadcasting messages to audiences in a fairly indiscriminate and relatively neutral 
fashion (obviously readers of high-end glossy magazines will not be sent the same ads 
as readers of tabloid newspapers), one-to-one advertising seeks to match the 
personality and needs of the recipient as closely as possible in order to reach 
consumers more efficiently. In many cases, the recipient of the message will find such 
ads useful and may even actively solicit them. Even when it is legitimate, however, the 
manipulation that is intrinsic to all advertising is exponentially greater here as the 
message may be communicated in a covert (in the form of information) or misleading 
way (the recipient is unaware that the message comes from a third party and not from 
the website they are visiting). The manipulation will be all the more potent, 
furthermore, in that your profile will “pinpoint” your innermost self, playing on your 
emotions, inclinations (including sexual ones), race, even your disabilities or 
opinions54. The danger here is particularly acute because in complex AI systems (such 
as deep learning), it is difficult to make the models transparent and the risk of 
manipulation is hard to detect, prompting talk of “black boxes". 
 
Customer targeting can nevertheless have complementary objectives: adaptive pricing 
combines an estimate of the intensity of demand for a given product with the “profile” 
and offers different Internet users different prices based on this variable. Another 
purpose is to select potential contracting parties, by preventing some people from 
viewing certain messages or eliminating others by making offers that are ludicrous. In 
one high-profile case in the United States, Facebook was sued when a lettings agency 
used Facebook’s profiling services to screen out enquiries from prospective tenants or 
buyers belonging to certain groups (African-Americans, people on low incomes, LGBT, 
etc). In the field of employment, too, it is not uncommon for candidates to be selected 
on the basis of data that have been analysed by machine, according to criteria which 
will have been articulated to a greater or lesser degree when using the profiling 
algorithms.   
 
 
B. Profiling in the context of a contractual relationship  
 
20. The needs of the contract - The purpose of the profiling in this case will be to evaluate 
the contracting person, but this evaluation will itself have different objectives: to 
                                                          
54 See in particular the article by Kosinsky et al.,  “Private traits and attributes are predictable from digital records 
of human behavior” (2013) which looks at what Facebook can deduce from Likes:  “We show that easily accessible 
digital records of behavior, Facebook Likes, can be used to automatically and accurately predict a range of highly 
sensitive personal attributes including: sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and political views, personality 





evaluate the contractual performance of an employee, for example, in connection with 
a promotion or dismissal, or, more broadly, of a customer in the context of a bank or 
insurance company trying to decide how much to lend or how much to charge in 
premiums, or to determine customer profitability. Alternatively, there may be financial 
or other risks to be assessed when evaluating a partner, whether a business or an 
individual, in order to decide whether it is worth continuing the relationship. 
  
C. Profiling and activities relating to the “marketing” of profiles.  
 
21. The marketing of data or profiles – Holders of Big Data may be tempted to offer 
profiling services to third parties either as simple providers of data or in response to 
requests from the “customer” to develop the necessary algorithms and apply them to 
their own data; the Big Data holders would then make the persons profiled available, 
or offer to perform themselves whatever operation the third party requires. The 
existence of datasets, whether open source or proprietary, and the provision of 
algorithms free of charge by research laboratories or on a commercial basis by 
companies offering profiling services were discussed in the first chapter. The 
“Facebook Fan Page” affair and the Cambridge Analytica scandal are worth citing here. 
In the former, Facebook provided the administrators of a fan page with information 
on the profiles of people visiting the site so that they could learn more about the 
visitors who liked their fan page and design a better strategy. The Cambridge Analytica 
(CA) case concerned the use of data generated by the social network and 
supplemented by CA’s co-called research surveys. In the Facebook-Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, 87 million Facebook users were affected when Cambridge Analytica 
began harvesting their personal data in 2014. The information was used to influence 
voting intentions in favour of politicians who paid for CA's services. The aim was to 
ascertain people's political leanings and even predict how they would vote and to 
market the findings to political operators, so that they could tailor their political 
marketing strategies. Just recently, the Financial Times (4 September 2019) revealed 
how Google had been sharing data with commercial companies precisely for the 
purpose of facilitating their profiling activities55.  
 
D. Profiling and research activities  
 
22. Profiling as an aid to research – In the context of research projects, researchers can 
use data typically gathered by public or private authorities for primary purposes to 
develop profiling in order to better understand a particular phenomenon and so 
improve their knowledge and understanding. Researchers interested in personnel 
management, for instance, will use corporate data, interviews with relevant actors and 
data held by the employment or finance ministry to try to understand how certain 
factors may account for professional success or the lack thereof. In the medical field, 
artificial intelligence is widely used to construct profiles, including genetic profiles, of 
                                                          
55 The Financial Times (4/09) revealed how Google had been undermining its own data privacy policies and 
circumventing EU regulations which require consent and transparency. The firm had been labelling Internet 
users with an identifying tracker. It then invited its advertising clients to log on to a hidden web page containing 






people suffering from a particular disease and so predict how the illness is likely to 
evolve and, if necessary, take preventive action. Vehicle manufacturers can likewise 
benefit from research using data on motorists’ use of vehicles and the context in which 
they are driven.  
 
Scientific research has been the subject of various special arrangements because of 
the benefits that it brings. As we know, the GDPR takes the view that, subject to 
appropriate safeguards (accreditation of laboratories, use of pseudonyms, etc), the 
research purpose is not incompatible with the primary purposes of data processing. 
More recently, notwithstanding the Database Directive, the Copyright in a Digital 
Society Directive exempts public-interest scientific institutions from any restrictions on 
the use of databases through data mining. In other words, the European instruments, 
while making profiling in the context of research subject to certain conditions, 
nevertheless take a positive view of such activities.  
   
 
E. Profiling by public authorities 
 
23. Profiling for governments and administrations - Profiling allows public authorities and 
administrations to pursue a variety of objectives. First and foremost, it is useful in 
devising strategies, whether economic expansion policies, or policies on subsidised 
housing, mobility, education or employment assistance56. To this end, the authorities 
consider myriad factors and combine reams of data from public and private sources to 
produce "predictive models" for determining what impact a particular policy is likely 
to have. It is easy to see how, if not programmed correctly (bias, poor data quality or 
errors in the algorithms), activities of this kind could affect certain groups or, at any 
rate, how decisions based on such forecasts could affect the members of these groups.  
 
One area where AI and profiling systems can be a ready source of efficiency gains is 
when it comes to implementing rules and regulations. As part of a philosophy of 
"benevolent government", where the state plays a proactive role with respect to its 
citizens, such systems can be used not only to spot or even select people who could 
benefit from special assistance, or to ensure students receive the best possible advice 
about education pathways, etc, but also to detect problem families (child abuse) or 
even social security fraudsters or tax evaders. Predictive justice, which is intended to 
replace judges, is also worth mentioning in this context insofar as any dispute can be 
“profiled” according to the many and varied characteristics of the case, analysed in the 





                                                          
56 For information about various examples of decision-making systems in the public sector and in support of 
governmental strategies, see the report “Automating Society -  Taking Stock of Automated Decision-Making in 
the EU”: A report by AlgorithmWatch in cooperation with Bertelsmann Stiftung, supported by the Open Society 





F. Profiling and criminal investigation and prosecution bodies   
  
24. AI as an aid to policing and prosecution - The European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights in its 201757 report identifies two kinds of profiling in this area: "There are two 
main purposes of profiling in the context of law enforcement and border management: 
to identify known individuals based on intelligence concerning a specific individual, 
and as a predictive method to identify "unknown' individuals who may be of interest 
to law enforcement and border management authorities. Both may include conscious 
or unconscious biases that may discriminate against individuals.” The idea, then, is to 
act either in response to an offence that has already been committed or proactively so 
as to prevent possible crimes. In the latter case, an overarching strategy may be 
devised that will lead to decisions relating either to entire groups (for example, 
monitoring a particular community) or to individuals.  
 
Either way, the Agency underlines the risk of discrimination associated with profiling 
of this kind and points out that according to the European directive: "Profiling falling 
under the scope of the Police Directive should abide by Article 11 (3) of the Police 
Directive. It provides that"[p]rofiling that results in discrimination against natural 
persons on the basis of special categories of personal data referred to in Article 10* 
shall be prohibited, in accordance with Union law". There remains the question of 
criteria based on data other than the “sensitive” kind. For example, level of education 
or mobility could also be a consideration when seeking to identify criminogenic 
settings. One suspects that it is not the nature of the data but the purpose of the 
processing that creates the risk.  
 
  
II. Classification by risk  
25. Risks as an important criterion to be considered in the recommendation – It is our 
belief that not all profiling should be regulated the same way and that, instead, 
profiling needs to be understood according to the nature of the risks engendered and 
the implications of the processing for the data subjects or society. This concern is 
reflected in Convention 108+, both in Article 10.2 and in the Explanatory Report 
(paragraph 88): "Paragraph 2 clarifies that before carrying out a data processing 
activity, the controller will have to examine its potential impact on the rights and 
fundamental freedoms of the data subjects.” It is also evident in Article 10.4, which 
allows the parties to include obligations in addition to those laid down in the other 
provisions “taking into consideration the risks at stake”. These risks, moreover, may be 
assessed at a micro level, ie the data subject, or at a macro level, ie existing social 
groups, whether organised or not, or at both levels. Lastly, insofar as the profiling 
involves different actors, each of whose actions has the potential to cause harm, it is 
important to make it clear how each one is to bear their share of the risk.  
 
In our discussion, we start from the notion of high risk processing developed by the 
European Union texts and suggested by the Council of Europe, especially in its 
                                                          
57 FRA, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Preventing unlawful profiling today and in the future: a 





Guidelines on Big Data and AI (A). Attention will then turn to the legal arrangements 
associated with this concept (B). 
 
 
A.  The concept of “high risk” in European texts  
a. The GDPR 
 
26. The requirement to carry out risk assessment - Article 35.1 of the GDPR states: 
“Where a type of processing in particular using new technologies, and taking into 
account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in 
a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall, prior to 
the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing 
operations on the protection of personal data.” Article 27.1. of the “Police Directive” 
employs the same wording. The concept of “high risk” is central to European thinking, 
therefore. The same article of the GDPR sets out three hypothetical situations which 
could be considered examples of “high risk” processing. These three scenarios are 
particularly relevant where profiling is concerned.  
 
a) systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural 
persons which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on 
which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural 
person or similarly significantly affect the natural person; 
b)  processing on a large scale of special categories of data referred to in Article 
9(1), or of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences 
referred to in Article 10; or 
c) a systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale. 
 
Point (a) refers directly to profiling and therefore needs to be taken into account; the 
second point concerns the creation of Big Data involving sensitive information. When 
profiling is combined with Big Data of this type, risk assessment becomes even more 
necessary. The third and last scenario concerns the collection of data for the purpose 
of monitoring an area accessible to the public (streets, cinemas, shops, etc). There is 
little doubt that such monitoring, if it is intended to be systematic, will use profiling 
techniques that rely, for example, on facial recognition, movement analysis, the 
Internet of Things, etc. 
  
27. Processing operations deemed “high risk” under the GDPR – A close look at EU 
legislation shows that profiling is considered “high risk” in the following instances:  
 
• The evaluation of a natural person through profiling is presumed to be “high risk” 
if it is carried out in a systematic and extensive fashion. Presumably this is to 
exclude one-off evaluations, but also evaluations that would lead to simplistic 
assessments about personality. The interpretation of this second point is 





sensitive nature of the data (the data may be trivial) but rather the outcome 
(processing these trivial data may lead to detecting a person's nervousness in times 
of stress). The processing activity must also have legal effects on the data subject 
or significantly affect them. This echoes the ideas expressed in Article 22 of the 
GDPR, on automated processing. The Guidelines define both of these notions at 
length. Examples of a legal effect of a decision generated or suggested by 
processing would include cancellation of a contract, or the award or denial of a 
social welfare benefit, or, add the Guidelines, admission (or refused admission) to 
a country or denial of citizenship. “Significantly affect” implies that the damage 
persists over time, that it leads to exclusion or discrimination, and that it concerns 
a financial, health or education service or employment. The Guidelines do not 
exclude certain types of profiling for advertising purposes, depending on the extent 
of the data collected, the reasonable expectations of the data subject, the 
techniques used to target the advertising and, above all, how knowledge of the 
data subject's vulnerabilities is used. The document goes on to state that practices 
such as dynamic pricing should also in some cases be treated as “high risk” 
processing operations.    
 
• “Large-scale” processing of the sensitive data referred to in Article 9 of the GDPR, 
ie “Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of 
genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural 
person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or 
sexual orientation” as well as data relating to criminal convictions is considered 
“high risk”. Here, the main reason for this designation is the risk of discrimination. 
The latter may be directed against individuals, of course, but it may equally concern 
entire ethnic groups and this possibility also needs to be considered, 
notwithstanding the text of the GDPR. We would also point out, and this is another 
criticism of the EU text, that what should determine whether an operation qualifies 
as “high risk” processing of this kind is not necessarily the sensitive content of the 
data, as stated in Article 35, but rather the purpose of the operation, insofar as the 
revelation of the sensitive character may come about as a result of the processing 
(see Article 9: “Processing of personal data revealing…”). In the Cambridge 
Analytica case, for example, it was shown that political opinions could be deduced 
from non-sensitive data linked simply to social media use. The term “large-scale” 
suggests that only processing involving a large population, based on the 
geographical context or the population liable to be affected, is covered.  
 
• The third hypothetical situation concerns processing in publicly accessible areas58 
and seems to focus only on systematic surveillance processing carried out, say, for 
security purposes (eg for a department store, to guard against theft or other 
offences). The reason given is that it is impossible for anyone present in a public 
place (street, department store, hotel, government offices, etc) to escape such 
surveillance. We would add that data may be gathered in public areas for purposes 
                                                          
58 The use of the term “areas” seems to indicate that only physical and non-virtual spaces are covered. 
Consideration could be given to widening the scope to include communication or news platforms whose 





other than "monitoring" alone. For example, a department store may wish to 
suggest other items for purchase and, where appropriate, share the data collected 
with companies operating in a different sector such as tourism for profiling 
purposes. Note that the text does not preclude a broad interpretation of the term 
“monitoring” and could also, therefore, cover commercial purposes of this type.  
 
 
b) Council of Europe instruments 
 
28. What about the Council of Europe? - The explanatory report to Convention 108+, 
when commenting on the possibility for member states to provide for additional 
obligations in the event of higher risks, provides a few criteria: "Such adaptation should 
be done considering the nature and volume of data processed, the nature, scope and 
purposes of the data processing and, in certain cases, the size of the processing entity.” 
We would add that the capacity of the persons targeted could also be an indicator 
since, as has already been pointed out, certain categories such as children and possibly 
other groups as well, such as patients or employees, are easier to manipulate. It is clear 
that processing activity which met several of these criteria would undoubtedly qualify 
as “high risk”. The Guidelines on Big Data suggest a further criterion for "high risk": 
"Exposing data subjects to different risks or greater risks than those contemplated by 
the initial purposes could be considered as a case of further processing of data in an 
unexpected manner." This is an important point because, increasingly, our data are 
blended with others to form pools into which the artificial intelligence systems that 
make profiling possible can dip in order to pursue a range of goals. The transfer to third 
parties of profiles or data leading to profiling and/or data sharing should also, in our 
view, be considered “high risk”.  
 
29. The notion of “special risks” had already been mentioned in the Council’s 2010 
recommendation and that this is undoubtedly what inspired the GDPR when it talks 
about “high risk” processing. Section 9.2 of the recommendation reads as follows: 
“Furthermore, in cases of processing that use profiling and entail special risks with 
regard to the protection of privacy and personal data, member states may foresee 
either: a. that controllers have to notify the supervisory authority in advance of the 
processing; or b. that this processing is subject to prior checking by the supervisory 
authority.” It is a pity that the concept was not better defined in the recommendation, 
but the above at least shows the importance attached by the Council of Europe, from 
as early as 2010, to developing special rules requiring the supervisory authority to 
monitor or even approve profiling operations that are more than usually hazardous. 
    
Another point made in the Guidelines on Big Data and Artificial Intelligence has been 
highlighted several times already. Paragraph 2.3 of the Guidelines on Big Data reads: 
“Since the use of Big Data may affect not only individual privacy and data protection, 
but also the collective dimension of these rights, preventive policies and risk-
assessment shall consider the legal, social and ethical impact of the use of Big Data, 
including with regard to the right to equal treatment and to non-discrimination.” Our 
position, in line with both Convention 108 Committee Guidelines, is that in order to 





given to the full range of societal and collective risks, such as the risk of discrimination, 
or risks relating to social justice, the functioning of our democracies, etc and not just 
to the risks facing individuals.  
  
 
B.  How best to regulate profiling, in particular the high risk kind? 
 
30. Towards multiple regimes? – It is probably hard to devise a single legal regime that 
would cover all profiling activities. The proportionality rule, ie the need for regulations 
commensurate with the risks created and for an appropriate response to them, is 
worth noting here. Regulation that would be excessively costly to implement and miss 
its mark is to be avoided. We will have an opportunity to demonstrate this is point III, 
when we review the different types of profiling. For now, though, we will turn our 
attention to the various ideas expressed not only in the European Union and Council 
of Europe texts already mentioned but also in other documents, in particular those 
relating to ethics and artificial intelligence. 
 
Certainly, the first rule, for anyone introducing profiling or, simply, a software tool 
(profiling algorithm) or database intended for one or more profiling operations, is to 
identify the risks associated with the planned operations or to which those operations 
contribute or might contribute. The risk is twofold. While the European texts cited 
focus on the possible effects of profiling - risk of discrimination, manipulation, forced 
surveillance or even societal risks associated with a particular processing operation - it 
is also important to consider, as for any processing operation but bearing in mind the 
particular features of the system, the risks specific to the system’s security: for 
example, the risks relating to confidentiality, lack of integrity of the raw or processed 
data or even the risk that the system might be unavailable. The recently adopted OECD 
recommendations and the recommendations of the European High Level Group on 
Artificial Intelligence (2018) all emphasise this need for security. For example, Section 
1.4 of the OECD recommendations, entitled: “Robustness, security and safety”, states: 
   
“a)AI systems should be robust, secure and safe throughout their entire 
lifecycle so that, in conditions of normal use, foreseeable use or misuse, 
or other adverse conditions, they function appropriately and do not 
pose unreasonable safety risk.  
b)To this end, AI actors should ensure traceability, including in relation 
to datasets, processes and decisions made during the AI system 
lifecycle, to enable analysis of the AI system’s outcomes and responses 
to inquiry, appropriate to the context and consistent with t he state of 
art.  
c)AI actors should, based on their roles, the context, and their ability 
to act, apply a systematic risk management approach to each phase of 
the AI system lifecycle on a continuous basis to address risks related to 







31. Multidisciplinary thinking – Any thinking on this subject needs to be collective and 
multidisciplinary insofar as the risk associated with any processing activity will 
obviously depend on the quality and appropriateness both of the chosen database 
(consider the example of databases used for automatically identifying wedding 
pictures, which overwhelmingly feature western-style weddings or databases that 
identify families of children abused in a different historical and social context) and of 
the algorithm used. Of particular note in this regard is the Report accompanying 
Convention No. 108+ (paragraph 86): “Paragraph 2 clarifies that before carrying out a 
data processing activity, the controller will have to examine its potential impact on the 
rights and fundamental freedoms of the data subjects. This examination can be done 
without excessive formalities. It will also have to consider respect for the 
proportionality principle on the basis of a comprehensive overview of the intended 
processing. In some circumstances, where a processor is involved in addition to the 
controller, the processor will also have to examine the risks. IT systems developers, 
including security professionals, or designers, together with users and legal experts 
could assist in examining the risks.” No doubt a written document will record the key 
points of this assessment, the persons involved in the exercise and the decisions 
reached.  
 
The GDPR requires this “risk assessment” procedure to include certain specific steps 
where high risk profiling is concerned. Article 35.7 states: “The assessment shall 
contain at least: 
a) a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations 
and the purposes of the processing, including, where applicable, 
the legitimate interest pursued by the controller;  
b) an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the 
processing operations in relation to the purposes;  
c) an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects referred to in paragraph 1; and 
d) the measures envisaged to address the risks, including 
safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the 
protection of personal data and to demonstrate compliance with 
this Regulation taking into account the rights and legitimate 
interests of data subjects and other persons concerned.”  
 
32. Need for the assessment to be multidisciplinary and open – The Council of Europe 
Guidelines on AI state: “In all phases of the processing, including data collection, AI 
developers, manufacturers and service providers should adopt a human rights by-
design approach and avoid any potential biases, including unintentional or hidden, 
and the risk of discrimination or other adverse impacts on the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of data subjects. AI developers should critically assess the 
quality, nature, origin and amount of personal data used, reducing unnecessary, 
redundant or marginal data during the development, and training phases and then 
monitoring the model’s accuracy as it is fed with new data. The use of synthetic data 
may be considered as one possible solution to minimise the amount of personal data 






Other instruments also emphasise the need for openness in this procedure. One such 
is the Guidelines on Big Data (see paragraph 7.3) which call for openness on two fronts. 
Firstly, the procedure must be conducted by an interdisciplinary group: “This 
assessment process should be carried out by persons with adequate professional 
qualifications and knowledge to evaluate the different impacts, including the legal, 
social, ethical and technical dimensions.” Secondly, representatives of the individuals 
or groups concerned should be involved in the assessment. The Guidelines call for the 
groups concerned to play an active part in the process (“participatory assessment”). 
“AI developers, manufacturers and service providers are encouraged to set up and 
consult independent committees of experts from a range of fields, as well as engage 
with independent academic institutions, which can contribute to designing human 
rights-based and ethically and socially-oriented AI applications, and to detecting 
potential bias. Such committees may play an especially important role in areas where 
transparency and stakeholder engagement can be more difficult due to competing 
interests and rights, such as in the fields of predictive justice, crime prevention and 
detection.” This seems to us to be sound advice given the complexity and difficulty of 
gauging the impact of processing and the fact that profiling affects not only the 
individual profiled, but everyone else too, whether profiled or not. An individualist 
approach to protection, moreover, is hardly realistic in a world where the power of 
data controllers far exceeds that wielded by individuals.   
 
It is important that the Council of Europe make the case for consultation or even 
negotiation with associations representing the interests of data subjects. The 
Guidelines on Big Data echo this view: “With regard to the use of Big Data which may 
affect fundamental rights, the Parties should encourage the involvement of the 
different stakeholders (eg individuals or groups potentially affected by the use of Big 
Data) in this assessment process and in the design of data processing.” 
  
33. Towards the creation of a multidisciplinary body for “ethical” evaluation of AI 
systems and in particular profiling powered by AI – In addition to this internal 
company procedure or in order to support such a procedure, the Council of Europe 
could recommend that member states set up a multidisciplinary body for the 
“ethical” evaluation of AI systems59 and, in the context that concerns us here, of 
profiling operations. The role of this "independent multidisciplinary national 
authority for the assessment of risks related to artificial intelligence and in particular 
to profiling using machine learning” would be manifold. Tasked with auditing, testing 
and labelling AI systems in the private or public sectors, this independent authority 
would act on a mandatory basis in the case of AI used in public-sector activities and, 
subject to what may be decided by member states regarding high risk systems, on a 
voluntary basis for systems operating in the private sector. 
 
This authority would issue opinions on, firstly, any individual or collective profiling 
envisaged by administrations or the regulatory authority to support their strategies or 
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served as a basis for preparing the Recommendation on artificial intelligence, in particular page 16 et seq. The 
author makes the case for a national approach to complement the introduction of procedures at company 





apply regulations, and secondly, on the assessment of risks associated with private or 
public policies relating to data sharing and open data and support for the design and 
delivery of good practice. The authority should make recommendations on the quality 
of Big Data and profiling algorithms in order to ensure their reliability, transparency 
and compliance with applicable legislation, in particular on data protection, consumer 
protection, non-discrimination, competition, etc. Although it would work closely with 
the supervisory authorities, its assessments would have a wider remit than the latter, 
as they would also cover collective risks. These opinions and recommendations would 
be made public. 
 
It is further proposed that this authority, subject to any other labelling or certification 
bodies which there may be, whether industry-wide or other, should also be able to 
respond to companies’ requests to evaluate and “certify” their own systems. This 
certification mechanism would be purely voluntary but, through the quality label 
awarded, would help build much-needed public trust and social acceptance. In the 
proposed internal or external assessment, particular attention would need to be given 
to the following:  
 
o The need to combat errors, by examining the database sets used and checking 
for sets or data that are inadequate, that have not been updated or contain 
errors and algorithms that are badly designed or unfit for purpose or contain 
bugs that may lead to undesirable results;   
o The need to abide by the principles of “privacy by design” and “privacy by 
default” when designing the profiling process itself; 
o The need to provide for a test phase and evaluation of the results of this test 
before actually commencing profiling;  
o The need to make data subjects aware of the existence of the current or 
planned profiling with an obligation to ensure easy access (by clicking on an 
icon?) to a more detailed description of the characteristics of the profiling 
carried out in respect of them; 
o Generally speaking, measures that facilitate understanding of how profiling 
works, the resources used, the impact on the person, and how to challenge the 
outcome of any such profiling. The OECD describes the purpose of such 
measures when they relate to a profiling system using AI as follows: “AI actors 
should commit to transparency and responsible disclosure regarding AI 
systems. To this end, they should provide meaningful information, 
appropriate to the context, and consistent with the state of art:  
i.to foster a general understanding of AI systems,  
ii.to make stakeholders aware of their interactions with AI systems, 
including in the workplace,  
iii.to enable those affected by an AI system to understand the outcome, 
and,  
iv.to enable those adversely affected by an AI system to chal lenge its 
outcome based on plain and easy-to-understand information on the 
factors, and the logic that served as the basis for the prediction, 






III.  Initial thoughts on applying the principles to a few 
identified categories of profiling.  
 
34. Reminder of the principle that regulatory measures must be proportional – Below we 
share a few thoughts on both the risks and the kind of measures that could be devised 
for the types of profiling identified. No doubt there will be other possible suggestions 
and, perhaps too, some objections but in our view, it is imperative that we conduct 
this exploratory process in order to show how dangerous and, in many cases, 
potentially excessive any regulation that sought to capture all profiling activities would 
be. 
 
A. Profiling in a precontractual context 
 
35. Profiling for advertising purposes – Among the profiling operations liable to be carried 
out in the contractual phase, a distinction will thus be made between those which 
consist in sending out ads based on categories which have either been specified by the 
controller, in full or in part (supervised AI systems), or been discovered by the system 
itself (unsupervised AI systems). In cases like these, we will merely reiterate the need 
for internal risk assessment focusing on the quality of the data used, with care being 
taken to ensure that the data subject is informed about the profiling being carried out 
(via an icon) and has some simple means (eg clicking on the profiling alert icon) of 
learning about the characteristics of the system and how it works and even the quality 
label and of objecting, where necessary. The “privacy by default” rule in any case 
requires that certain service providers which have a dominant position in the market 
or operate a service that is in the public interest (such as news platforms or social 
networks) must offer a meaningful and non-discriminatory alternative (eg via the rule 
that any who refuse must “pay” for access) to profiling for advertising purposes or, at 
any rate, modulate the ways in which the data gathered can be used, as already 
happens with some sites.  
 
36. High risk profiling – As we see it, there are five circumstances in which further 
measures aimed specifically at high risk processing are required. Besides the measures 
already indicated, each of these cases merits a few additional comments. The first is, 
of course, profiling young people, where there is a need to counter the heightened 
risks of manipulation. One option here might be to have a system of parental 
authorisation and, in any case, intervention by an internal evaluation committee. The 
second case concerns profiling that allows dynamic pricing: information on this 
particular feature of the profiling must be given to the data subjects and consumer 
representatives must be involved in the risk assessment with respect to the pricing 
margins and also the criteria to ensure they are not discriminatory. Thirdly, there is the 
case of profiling which may or may not use sensitive data but which, directly or 
indirectly, has the effect of revealing such data. Profiling of this type must be 
prohibited except in special circumstances, in particular where the data subject has 





of sensitive data, in direct connection with the quality of the service offered60. In any 
risk assessment and when evaluating tests prior to the use of profiling, particular 
attention must be paid to the possibility of bias favouring discrimination based on 
sensitive data or the exclusion of certain persons, no matter what the criteria.  
 
The last two cases likewise call for comments as they involve taking decisions that have 
the potential to “significantly impact” the individuals concerned. The fourth situation, 
profiling for the purpose of selecting customers, must be based on relevant criteria 
directly related to the proposed transaction. Clearly, some criteria will be 
automatically excluded here. It is important to maintain a fair balance between the 
benefits to companies, in particularly lending institutions, of having a thorough 
understanding of their future customers, as required by law and as summed up in the 
phrase "Know your customer", and the need to avoid judging people based on 
decision-making criteria which go beyond what the data subjects could reasonably and 
legitimately expect. Lastly, it might be advisable here to include a provision to the 
effect that profiling may or even must be certified by the authority mentioned above 
(paragraph 33) or by industry-specific laboratories (covering, for example, banking and 
insurance, the housing sector, etc) accredited by the authority (?) which could 
independently evaluate the decision-making systems envisaged. In the case of a 
quality label, a provision could usefully be inserted to the effect that clicking on the 
label icon would bring up a description of the criteria used to build the profile. 
Attention is also drawn to the need for individuals to be able to challenge automated 
decisions and to access their profiles in an easy-to-understand form after processing. 
 
The fifth possible scenario concerns profiling in the context of staff recruitment. Many 
of the remarks made regarding customer selection could also apply here: the need to 
offer a right to contest the “truths” emanating from the computer; the use of criteria 
that are relevant to the job application, access to profiles, etc. It would be 
recommended labelling the profiling systems used, preferably following consultation 
with staff representatives, especially if they are based on emotion recognition 
techniques61, given the risks of bias and misinterpretation associated with the use of 
such techniques. 
   
Lastly, the risk of undue manipulation by exploiting the vulnerabilities of others (see 
paragraph 11 above) requires that particular attention be paid to the economic, 
intellectual and social status of the parties involved and the techniques used by the 
controller to bring about the desired decision.     
 
B. Profiling in the context of contract performance 
 
37.  Customer performance profiling – Profiling for the purpose of evaluating the 
“performance” of a customer (e. g. bank customer) or employee is high risk because of 
                                                          
60 Suppose, for example, I wanted the operator of my favourite music platform to pre-select music to match my 
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61 It will be noted that these affective computing systems may also be used in customer selection processing 





the consequences that its use entails. It might determine, for example, whether a 
person secures a loan or gets a promotion. Once again, there is a need to consider the 
risks associated with these processing activities, taking into account the various 
interests involved (consumers or staff representatives); checks will need to be carried 
out to ensure the algorithms are sound and that there is no bias (risk assessment 
procedure) and the earlier comments about industry-specific labelling are worth 
reiterating here.   
 
Some basic information will need to be provided concerning the data taken into 
account, the approximate weight assigned to each criterion and the consequences 
attached to each profile and these points discussed. Data subjects will be able to see 
what data were used, where they came from, an indication of the weight assigned to 
each criterion, and either the “profile” obtained and the consequences of this 
“profile”, or an explanation in plain language of the model used by the algorithm. 
Lastly, provision must be made for a right to challenge the computer’s decision, with 
no adverse consequences for the person exercising it, etc. To be effective, this 
possibility of challenging a decision requires that a competent unit with sufficient 
expertise to query the "truth" coming out of the computer be set up within the 
company. 
 
C. Profiling carried out by public authorities (except police and judicial authorities 
responsible for prosecuting criminal offences)   
 
38. Profiling by public authorities - Profiling by public authorities is undertaken or may be 
undertaken for various purposes, in particular as part of a proactive policy of 
"benevolent government" or for the purposes of law enforcement by introducing 
monitoring to verify compliance through the use of expert systems or AI systems. The 
introduction of any such profiling systems should, firstly, be provided for in 
unambiguous, proportionate legislation appropriate to the needs of a democratic 
society and, secondly, be subject to preliminary and regular assessments by the 
independent multidisciplinary body described above (see paragraph 33) both in terms 
of the algorithms to be used or already in use (data quality, absence of bias, etc) and 
system security. In our opinion, transparency of algorithms and sources is important 
insofar as it makes it possible to meet both the obligation to have access to public 
documents and the requirement to state the reasons on which public authorities’ 
decisions are based. Clearly, it should be possible to waive this rule in cases where 
transparency might not be in the public interest (disclosing the criteria used to combat 
benefit fraud, for example, would be counterproductive). At the same time, two 
precautionary measures would appear to be in order here: 
 
- introduce, from an organisational and management perspective, 1. a genuine 
supervisory procedure for decisions proposed as a result of profiling; 2. a 
requirement for public authorities to give advance notice of the use of profiling, 
along with details of how the system works and the sources on which it is based; 
3. a procedure that affords data subjects a real opportunity to express their 
views and exercise their right to a simulation in order to see how the algorithm 





- where the profiling results in a decision that is detrimental to the data subject 
(eg denial of social assistance or triggering of checks for benefit fraud), create 
a category to make it clear that the person has been identified as such via 
profiling. 
In particular, this body would be involved when profiling is carried out for the purposes 
of public administration. In April 2018, for example, the AI Now Institute devised a 
framework for public bodies wishing to implement algorithmic decision-making tools 
to enable citizens affected by these tools to challenge decisions affecting them. The 
recommendations are also aimed at the designers of these systems, which are already 
widely used in government. The AI Now initiative62 accordingly calls for an end to the 
use of opaque systems for public decision-making, in order to ensure fair and lawful 
procedures and to protect members of the public against discrimination of any kind. 
Such systems must also respect the right to public information, as enshrined in the 
European directives on access to official documents, and, in addition, comply with the 
duty incumbent on public authorities to give reasons for their decisions.  
 
To this end, it is recommended63 that a regular audit be carried out by the authority, 
which would have an AI systems assessment centre, a test and audit centre that would 
operate independently of the State. This centre should also ensure that efforts are 
made to improve the expertise of the organisations that design AI systems used by the 
authority and its staff. It would set out the organisational and technical procedures 
whereby citizens could challenge decisions taken on the basis of AI systems. The 
initiative recommends that government agencies identify and describe any automated 
decision-making systems, including an assessment of their scope and impact. It further 
recommends that access procedures be put in place so that researchers, independent 
experts, associations or journalists can access and evaluate these systems, and that 
agencies see to it that any private companies supplying them with systems agree to 
these checks. It also emphasises that agencies need to develop better skills in order to 
have expert knowledge of the systems they introduce, and in particular to improve the 
way they communicate with the public, and invites solution providers to give priority 
to fairness, accountability and transparency in their offerings. That would also allow 
public bodies to develop procedures for mediation and challenging decisions. Lastly, 
requiring systems to publish impact assessments of their automated decision-making 




                                                          
62  As G. BRAIBANT wrote in 1971,”(it) should require the public authority, whenever it relies on the results of 
processing by computer, to make known the data and programmes from which these results have been 
obtained; these data and programmes may thus be the subject of discussions likely to call into question their 
results.”. (G. BRAIBANT, « La protection des droits individuels au regard du développement technologique », 
Revue internationale de droit comparé, 1971, 23, p. 812) 
63 See in particular the report by the UK’s Select Committee on Communications, Regulating in a digital world, 





Chapter III: Analysis of the application of the various 
provisions of Convention 108+  
  
39. Purpose of Chapter III – In this chapter we seek to draw attention to the fact that the 
provisions of Convention 108+ as applied to profiling call for some interpretation which 
may serve as a basis for recommendations.   
 
A. Object and purpose of intervention in the field of profiling 
 
40. From individual risks to collective ones: where data protection is falling short -   As 
we have said before, the recent Convention 108 Committee Guidelines place 
considerable emphasis on this point. As noted in the MANTELERO Report, which 
introduces the Guidelines on Big Data, “Of course, data protection per se does not cover 
all these aspects, which require a broader approach encompassing human rights and 
societal issues”. This point has numerous ramifications where profiling is concerned. 
Clearly, there is a vital need to move from a “data protection risk assessment” and a 
“data protection by design” approach to a more comprehensive one based on “ethical 
values assessment and design” where concerns about social justice, cultural diversity, 
human dignity and democracy feature alongside those that relate to data protection 
alone. That does not mean turning one’s back on the Convention or the cause of data 
protection. As the rapporteur astutely observes, “Data protection’s focus on 
individuals, an awareness of the social consequences of data use and the link with 
personality rights may expand the data controller’s approach beyond data protection 
to fundamental rights and collective interests. Regarding its complementary role, data 
protection helps to reveal the way data are used and the purposes of processing, which 
represent key elements in a better understanding of the potential consequences for a 
variety of rights and freedoms.” Among other things, such a stance calls for a widening 
of the scope of the risks to be considered when assessing profiling, and for attention 
to be given to other interests, alongside those of data protection representatives. As 
noted by SCHULTZ and DREYER in the report cited above: “The GDPR and Automated 
Decision making : Will it deliver ?”: “Yet, the GDPR does not offer great potential when 
it comes to protecting group-related and societal interest such as non-discrimination, 




41. We will focus here on two terms: “personal data” and “data controller”.  
 
a. personal data  
 
42. The concept of personal data – The first term calls for the following comments. It is 
important to note that the notion of personal data now extends beyond the criterion 
of identifiability, which refers to the possibility for the profiler to link the data collected 





the possibility of “impacting” the data subject. It effectively marks a shift from 
identification to individuation. For example, the RFID tag worn by a shopper X moving 
around a supermarket might not reveal the identity of its wearer but it will make it 
possible to locate the person within the supermarket and send them an ad for an item 
in the vicinity. This raises questions about the ability of data subjects, who, although 
not identified, have certainly been singled out, to exercise their rights. It is important 
that they be able to exercise the latter (for example, the right to object or simply a 
right of access) online without revealing their identity. The recommendations must 
also take care not to confine themselves to personal data only, and to consider any 
anonymous data that go into constructing the profile. To make the data subject aware 
only of the personal data used to produce the profile, and to leave out anonymous 
data, would be to provide them with information that was incomplete or even 
meaningless. Whether data is anonymous or not should be judged having regard to 
the purpose of all the operations that lead to a person or group being profiled. The 
need to promote a holistic view of profiling (see the 2010 recommendation) is worth 
reiterating here. There can be no question of separating the various stages of profiling 
(data collection, data mining and application to a particular data subject or group) and 
judging each on its merits. It is from the end stage that all the other stages must be 
assessed. It seems to us, furthermore, that profiling (see our earlier comments on 
objectives and purpose) carries with it a major risk of discrimination against groups 
and even businesses. This brings us back to the debate, one that is no doubt worth 
rekindling, about the protection of groups, whether ethnic groups or groups of people 
with a common profile (residents of a particular neighbourhood who are labelled 
potential criminals, neighbourhoods condemned to long-term industrial decline, etc).  
 
43. What about legal entities?- This same concern follows on from a discussion that is still 
going on at the Council of Europe64 and has to do with the protection of legal entities, 
for whom profiling is increasingly a reality, sometimes with calamitous consequences. 
Entrepreneurial freedom is undermined by the information asymmetry that is 
currently a feature of the market for information. Thanks to digital technology, some 
platforms, some information service operators, banks and insurers have powerful tools 
at their disposal, including AIs capable of predicting the future of a company or 
subsidiary or even dooming it to failure with negative rankings. I believe there is a 
particular need to protect small and medium-sized companies against profiling of this 
type, including for the workers employed there and the areas where these companies 
are located. In saying this, we are not advocating that Convention 108+ be extended 
to include legal entities – protecting the latter requires a different mindset, one more 
akin to competition law than citizens' rights. We do, however, believe that subjective 
rights of access, rectification and erasure modelled on those conferred on 
individuals, protection against bias, etc should be granted to legal entities, not within 
the framework of the recommendation that concerns us here but rather in a 
regulation with a more economic focus. Such an instrument, we believe, would be 
useful – essential even - in an era when predictions are being powered by AI. Worth 
mentioning in this context are the new rights bestowed by the recent European Union 
Regulation 2019/1150 of 20 June 2019 promoting fairness and transparency for 
                                                          
64 J.P. WALTER, Le profilage des individus à l’heure du « cyberspace » : un défi pour le respect du droit à la 





business users of online intermediation services (OJEU 11.7.2019, L 186/57), which 
aims to protect the companies using platforms' services, in particular where their 
rankings are concerned. 
 
b. The concept of data controller 
 
44.  Multiplicity of actors and arrangements and qualification of the various actors – In 
our introduction we drew attention to the variety of arrangements under which a 
profiling system may be put in place, especially when it is based on AI technologies. 
Data can be derived from various sources, each with its own controllers, while the 
datasets, on which algorithms have already been running, may come from somewhere 
else; some basic algorithms are available on the web in open source while others are 
purchased from their designers under private licences. The task of adapting these 
different components to the needs of a given sector or company is often performed by 
specialised players. Last but not least, the task of applying profiling to individuals or 
groups may be entrusted to a third party, usually as a "turnkey" service provided by a 
platform. The latter, after all, will already have reams of data relating to the persons 
concerned and in many cases will already be using profiling algorithms for its own 
purposes. As we have pointed out (see paragraph *** above), it may make such 
algorithms - or even the results of these algorithms – available to third parties. The fact 
that all these players are involved raises the question of what status should be 
accorded to each one. The position of the authors of the two Convention 108 
Committee Guidelines  has already been established. As we have pointed out, both 
instruments seek to extend the obligations incumbent on each player directly or 
indirectly involved in the design, implementation and operation of profiling activities. 
There are two ways in which this widening may occur.  
 
For some suppliers of commercially available components needed to operate a 
profiling system (a basic algorithm, a dataset, a database), what are required, 
naturally, are product quality, a description of the limitations of the product and, 
where appropriate, co-operation in the risk assessment and during the test phase. 
Should we perhaps go further and consider some of these actors to be processors or 
even joint controllers in respect of the profiling in question? Ruling in the “Facebook 
Fan Pages” case, the ECJ concluded that, in some circumstances, those involved in 
profiling may be deemed joint controllers. In the case in question, a non-profit-making 
association running a singer’s fan club had wanted to “profile” its “clients”, ie readers 
of the singer’s blog. To this end, it obtained (in return for payment) data relating to the 
blog readers from the administrators of the platform by which readers accessed the 
blog, namely Facebook. In short, the former, the association, determined the purpose 
but the latter, the platform, determined the means. The latter was accordingly found 
to be jointly responsible and, to quote the Council of Europe convention, a co-decision-
maker sharing with the association “decision-making power with respect to data 
processing”: “When assessing whether the person or body is a controller, special 
account should be taken of whether that person or body determines the reasons 
justifying the processing, in other terms its purposes and the means used for it. Further 
relevant factors for this assessment include whether the person or body has control 





access it.” In some instances, the term “processor” might be preferred over “joint 
controller” in which case it will be important to ensure that the process of selecting 
the processor is accompanied by safeguards, that a contract is concluded between the 
controller and this/these processor/s regarding the use of the data, and their security, 
and that certain obligations are imposed on the processor such as notification in the 
event of security breaches, risk assessment, etc. 
 
C. Legitimacy of processing and data quality (Art. 5)    
 
45. Basic principles - Proportionality of processing in relation to the legitimate purpose 
pursued and a fair balance between all interests concerned are recognised as 
fundamental. First of all, it should be stressed that profiling is not an end in itself but 
rather a technique for achieving one of the many purposes already described in the 
proposed classification. It is with these aims in mind, therefore, that those responsible 
for profiling should be guided by the two principles of legitimacy and proportionality, 
and this, insists Article 5.1., from the design stage and throughout the profiling 
operation. These principles concern processing and so take us back to the issue of 
justification for the use of profiling and the ability of the data subject to choose in such 
matters: is the profiling really necessary and shouldn’t the data subject be allowed to 
choose between non-profiled and profiled access, or even between anonymous or 
identified access? Of particular relevance in both of these respects – the right to 
anonymity and the right not to be profiled – is Section 3.7 of the 2010 
recommendation, which reads: "As much as possible, and unless the service required 
necessitates knowledge of the data subject’s identity, everyone should have access to 
information about goods or services or access to these goods or services themselves 
without having to communicate personal data to the goods or service provider. In order 
to ensure free, specific and informed consent to profiling, providers of information 
society services should ensure, by default, non-profiled access to information about 
their services.” Aside from this initial point, it is important that the data subject be able 
in certain circumstances, in particular profiling for advertising purposes, to determine 
the purpose for which profiling may be performed and so reduce the scope of the data 
that will be used. For example, just because you use an online music service does not 
mean that you are amenable to having your musical tastes profiled, but if you want 
the provider to recommend or offer you music that matches your tastes, then that is 
what is required. You should be able to choose the various purposes and, where 
applicable, the recipients who will make it possible to achieve those purposes. So, 
staying with the example of online music services, it may be that I wish to be able to 
receive advertising from third parties about the release of a song by my favourite artist. 
Equally, however, the reverse may be true. In other words, the fact that I consent to 
the data controller carrying out profiling for advertising purposes does not necessarily 
mean that I consent to profiling by third parties, or to my data or profile being released 
to third parties.  
 
46. The need for assessment – These principles likewise call for participatory, 
multidisciplinary and if possible multi-stakeholder risk assessment and require that 
any such assessment be ongoing. Continuous assessment is all the more necessary as 





gathered and new possible correlations discovered, have their purposes altered by 
those who use them. For example, a profiling activity that was originally designed for 
one-to-one advertising may, when fed with additional data and new algorithms, 
develop into software for excluding or evaluating “clients”. Prison administrations, for 
instance, can use data relating to prisoners’ status, behaviour and environment to 
develop profiling that will be of assistance in making decisions about early release. 
Capturing location data from our mobile phones certainly makes it easier for users to 
find nearby restaurants or hotels (the primary purpose) but such data may then be sold 
to third parties or used by the same operator as the one which performed the initial 
processing to, say, carry out advertising for department stores or other providers of 
goods and services.  
   
47. IA systems and the principle of purpose – Complying with the principle of purpose 
limitation poses a challenge, therefore, in a world of complex, constantly evolving 
information systems which, at the whim of some AI, can be co-opted to perform new 
tasks linked to machine learning opportunities. This applies not only to profiling and 
raises the question of how such a fundamental principle as purpose limitation can be 
observed. Article 5.4 introduces a degree of flexibility in terms of how the principle is 
applied in that it does not prohibit purposes which are "compatible” with those of the 
original processing operation. The 2017 European Union Guidelines contain a reminder 
of the criteria by which compatibility is to be assessed, as set out in Article 6.4 of the 
GDPR65: “the controller shall, in order to ascertain whether processing for another 
purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially 
collected, take into account, inter alia: (a) any link between the purposes for which the 
personal data have been collected and the purposes of the intended further processing; 
the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular regarding the 
relationship between data subjects and the controller; (c) the nature of the personal 
data, in particular whether special categories of personal data are processed, pursuant 
to Article 9, or whether personal data related to criminal convictions and offences are 
processed, pursuant to Article 10; (d) the possible consequences of the intended further 
processing for data subjects; (e) the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may 
include encryption or pseudonymisation.” 
 
This long list of criteria can be used to inform the controller or controllers and must be 
taken into consideration when continuously evaluating profiling and, in any case, 
throughout the development phase, ie from the initial design, in the choice of 
algorithms, datasets, test planning, etc. Suppliers of components such as databases 
will also be required to pay attention to these criteria as part of their duties to provide 
information and advice. It should be noted that the generic purpose of some of these 
databases (eg a set of photos enabling facial recognition algorithms to work in different 
                                                          
65 In the case of public authority processing including activities involving the police, we believe that the only 
circumstance in which such “slippage of purpose” may be justified is when performing public tasks, under the 
supervision of the body described above. The Council of Europe, furthermore, concedes that, subject to 
“complementary safeguards” (rules on access to data, pseudonymisation, system of accreditation for research 
laboratories, non-commercialisation of results rule, etc) data collected for primary purposes (eg for treating 
patients) may also be processed – in this case used in profiling - for the purposes of scientific or historical research 





contexts)66 requires specific attention of this kind. As noted in the Guidelines on Big 
Data (paragraph 2.5.), therefore, it is with regard to each application that the person 
responsible for any datasets marketed commercially must ''identify and evaluate the 
risks of each processing activity involving Big Data and its potential negative outcome 
on individuals’ rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to the 
protection of personal data and the right to non-discrimination, taking into account the 
social and ethical impacts”.  
  
 
48. What about platform operators? A special point needs to be made with regard to 
platform operators. The activity linked to visitors’ use of the various sites made 
accessible or in any case accessed by these operators generates data that the latter 
consider as their own. The processing of these site usage data (and not just data 
relating to the choice of sites visited), however, generally exceeds the purpose pursued 
by the Internet user, who, although they certainly go through the operator's platform, 
will not necessarily want the operator to make use of this fact for the purposes of 
profiling or marketing to third parties. There may, of course, be situations in which the 
Internet user will be willing to allow, or even actively intend for, the platform operator 
to use their data in this way because they want the operator to analyse their profile in 
order to select sites that match their personality, or even, albeit less commonly, to 
share information about their behaviour and personality traits with third parties. As a 
general rule, however, such uses are not legitimate and should be permitted only with 
the data subject’s consent67. 
                                                          
66 These databases may be used in processing for a variety of applications developed by the data holder or by 
third parties (eg strategy development, customer profiling, scientific research, etc). 
67 In this connection, but with a different focus, the concern this time being to protect business users of platforms’ 
services, the recent EU Regulation 2019/1150 of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for 
business users of online intermediation services (OJEU 11.7. 2019, L 186/57) states (recital no. 34): “In the same 
vein, it is important for business users to understand whether the provider shares with third parties any data 
which has been generated through the use of the intermediation service by the business user. Business users 
should in particular be made aware of any sharing of data with third parties that occurs for purposes which are 
not necessary for the proper functioning of the online intermediation services; for example where the provider 
monetises data under commercial considerations. To allow business users to fully exercise available rights to 
influence such data sharing, providers of online intermediation services should also be explicit about possibilities 
to opt out from the data sharing where they exist under their contractual relationship with the business user.” 
Article 9 thus specifically provides for an obligation on the part of the operator to be transparent vis-à-vis 
business users, in particular : “Through the description referred to in paragraph 1, providers of online 
intermediation services shall adequately inform business users in particular of the following:  
(a) whether the provider of online intermediation services has access to personal data or other data, or both, 
which business users or consumers provide for the use of those services or which are generated through the 
provision of those services, and if so, to which categories of such data and under what conditions; 
 
(b) whether a business user has access to personal data or other data, or both, provided by that business user in 
connection to the business user’s use of the online intermediation services concerned or generated through the 
provision of those services to that business user and the consumers of the business user’s goods or services, 
and if so, to which categories of such data and under what conditions; 
 
(c) in addition to point (b), whether a business user has access to personal data or other data, or both, including 
in aggregated form, provided by or generated through the provision of the online intermediation services to all 







49. Principle of minimisation or proportionality of the data processed - The question of 
proportionality or data minimisation in relation to the purpose pursued throws up 
other challenges. Machine learning systems rely on statistical correlations based on 
arbitrary combinations of data. So, to take a purely fictitious scenario, the tax 
authorities might conclude from trawling through vast data banks that managers of 
companies with more than 200 employees and fewer than 400, who own a red car 
registered between year X and year Y, who take all-inclusive package holidays to the 
Mediterranean, live in a particular type of neighbourhood in cities with more than 
50,000 inhabitants and have a child and a dog are potential fraudsters. This example 
highlights the difficulty, in theory at any rate, of determining what elements will go 
into building a profile. Reaffirming the principle that data must be appropriate or even 
necessary in relation to the purpose pursued would demand that such work be done 
but, unless the criterion is interpreted broadly, users of AI systems will object to a 
narrow construction on the ground that the requirements imposed hinder innovation 
and prevent profiling from being fully effective. Consider the example of tracking down 
criminals. Sometimes unexpected correlations are what makes it possible to identify 
offenders. The Guidelines maintain the principle: "Controllers must make sure that 
they are complying with the data minimisation principle, ..." and see pseudonymisation 
as a solution. 
 
Without repeating all the requirements laid down in Article 5.4 (fairness, specified 
purposes, need for data to be relevant, accurate and kept up to date, storage period, 
etc), we will simply flag up a few issues that will need to resolved, initially through a 
sectoral approach, involving multi-stakeholder discussions, and then, if necessary, 
through the intervention of the data protection authorities or even lawmakers. 
 
-To what extent is it acceptable for an insurance company to make use of data 
relating to insured persons for the purpose of providing personalised services?  
-To what extent is it acceptable for a bank or credit institution to profile its 
clients, citing its responsibilities as a lender? 
-To what extent is it acceptable for an employer to use affective computing 
systems to select job applicants or manage the careers of existing staff? 
50. Processing time and data quality – Two further points on the subject of processing 
time and data quality. With regard to the period for which data may be kept, it would 
surely make sense to include a provision that would prohibit the use of some data 
beyond a certain period (eg data relating to surgical operations should cease to be used 
once the patient has been in remission for a given period), and the keeping of records 
                                                          
 
(d) whether any data under point (a) is provided to third parties, along with, where the provision of such data to 
third parties is not necessary for the proper functioning of the online intermediation services, information 
specifying the purpose of such data sharing, as well as possibilities for business users to opt out from that data 
sharing.” 
There is surely a need for this information to also be made available to Internet users, who should be able to 
ascertain to what extent data gleaned from their interaction with a particular site accessed via a platform are 





of accidents if no further accidents or risks of accidents (eg failed breath test) are 
reported. In addition, the person profiled should surely be able to insist that the 
controller disregard any data concerning them once a certain period has elapsed, 
which may vary according to the type of data and the purpose of the profiling.   
 
The quality of data when they come from Big Data held by a third party should be able 
to be documented by that third party or even certified by an accredited body. "In 
addition to safeguarding privacy and personal data, requirements must be fulfilled to 
ensure high quality AI systems. The quality of the data sets used is paramount to the 
performance of AI systems. When data is gathered, it may reflect socially constructed 
biases, or contain inaccuracies, errors and mistakes. This needs to be addressed prior 
to training an AI system with any given data set. In addition, the integrity of the data 
must be ensured. Processes and data sets used must be tested and documented at each 
step such as planning, training, testing and deployment. This should also apply to AI 
systems that were not developed in-house but acquired elsewhere. Finally, the access 
to data must be adequately governed and controlled." 
 
51. The issue of consent to profiling is crucial – Consent, of course, confers legitimacy and, 
as has already been noted, profiling may be considered to be of real benefit to data 
subjects looking for advice on how to navigate the maze of goods and services on offer. 
It is difficult to see in this case, however, how consent will differ from consent to a 
contract insofar as the data subject recognises that the processing of their own and 
other data is necessary for the profiling service required. Some might argue that the 
consent is revocable, but the contract that allows the controller to profile a client may 
be for an unspecified period and be revocable ad nutum. Also, the idea of contractual 
terms and conditions being negotiated collectively between consumer groups and the 
controller where it is proposed to carry out profiling on a large scale is, we believe, 
preferable in terms of protecting the privacy of data subjects to individual consent, 
where individuals are left to fend for themselves in the face of the economic might of 
the controllers68.  
 
Having said all that, we should stress that the attributes of consent stipulated in Article 
5.2. will seldom be met. They presuppose, subject to yet more requirements, that 
consent is freely given, ie without manipulation (see above), and that it is a genuine 
choice and not simply a matter of clicking “I agree”; consenting to profiling must not 
be a precondition for access to services typically regarded as essential for participation 
in social activity and, except in case of necessity due to the service itself (eg a distance 
tailoring service or distance learning), a non-profiled service should be offered by 
default; Article 5.2. further requires that any consent given be informed, which raises 
a number of issues (see our comments on Article 8). At the same time, consent 
presupposes - and this condition is clearly stated in the Council of Europe report69 - 
that the other tests of legitimacy set out in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of Article 5 have been 
met. That means, especially in the case of high risk profiling, compliance with the 
procedures and conditions already stipulated and, in the case of all profiling activities, 
                                                          
68 On all these points, see, Y. POULLET, « Consentement et RGPD : des zones d’ombre ! », DCCR, 2018, p. 3 – 39. 
69 “Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article 5 are cumulative and must be respected in order to ensure the legitimacy 





risk assessment and mandatory compliance with the principles of proportionality, 
purpose and security, even if construed broadly.   
 
There are other issues, too, surrounding this “consent”': under what circumstances will 
it be deemed permissible to consent to profiling in exchange for “remuneration”? As 
we see it, there is no room here for dogmatism. Everything hinges on the extent of the 
“remuneration” offered by the controller, the data in question, the purposes of the 
profiling envisaged, the restrictions placed on the scope for profiling and, above all, 
negotiation with not only the data protection authorities but also consumer 
representatives. 
   
D. Special categories of data (Article 6) 
 
52. Preliminary considerations – We will merely point out that the sensitivity of any 
processing operation is, of course, often intrinsic to the data themselves, but perhaps 
also, in the context of the last indent of Article 6.1., directly related to the purpose of 
the processing, where the data are not sensitive in themselves but processing them 
reveals racial or ethnic origin (eg selecting all names ending in “SKI” in order to trace 
the Polish origin of the persons concerned), political opinions (inferred from a person’s 
presence in the street during a political demonstration), trade union membership, 
religious beliefs, health status or information about a person’s sex life. It should be 
emphasised that numerous conscious or unconscious biases70 can thus affect the 
operating tools used in profiling, both in the selection of source data and in the choice 
of algorithms. It will also be noted that such profiling is “high risk” insofar as the risks 
of discrimination and restriction of religious, trade union or philosophical freedoms 
attached to the data are significant (see Article 6.2.). Last but not least, any profiling of 
groups (and not only individuals) carried out in this way must likewise be regulated.       
 
 
E. Data security (Art. 7)   
 
53. Security: a broadly defined concept - The use of AI systems in profiling underscores 
the need to define the integrity of processing as the search for and elimination 
(obligation of means) of any biases that might affect that processing. Once again, the 
use of third party algorithms71 will require the controller, in line with the “reasonable 
                                                          
70 J. GRIMMELMANN and D. WESTREICH, “Incomprehensible Discrimination”, California Law Review, 2017, vol. 
7, pp. 170–176. See the comments by L. EDWARDS and M. VEALE, “Enslaving the algorithm: from a 'right to an 
explanation' to a 'right to better decisions'?”, IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine, 2018, n.° 16, p. 52: For 
instance, biases may cause discrimination in automated decision-making on the basis of skin colour, or other 
legally protected attributes. Such biases may directly rely on those attributes, or indirectly. In the second case, 
AI tools detect correlations between diverse non-protected attributes to produce the same discriminatory results 
as if they were taking into account legally protected ones (proxies). An example of this could be the use of a 
person’s address (ie in an area where there is a high concentration of people with black skin) and his average 
wage to refuse credit, whereas a person with the same attributes but living in an area where most people have 
white skin would receive the credit. What would be your attitude if the problem were not the colour of people’s 
skin but simply the address? 
71 The issue arises when the algorithm is “open source”, supplied free of charge by a research body, for example. 
Placing onerous obligations on such designers would be counterproductive and would impede the flow of 





coder” principle72, to insist on seeing the results of tests undergone by the algorithm 
producer or even a quality label issued by an independent body, if the processing, at 
any rate, involves significant risks for individuals or society73. It has been observed that 
very often these algorithms are developed by scientific research centres, whether 
private companies or universities, and will have featured in publications that have 
been the subject of extensive discussion and in many cases criticism from third parties 
(see Chapter 1). We should point out that in some sectors, in particular health care, 
algorithms are certified by industry experts.   
 
The process of assessing “security” in terms of integrity, confidentiality and availability 
should start at the design stage of the profiling system and be continuous (see the 
2010 recommendation). There should be a report identifying the risks of external 
adverse effects on individuals and society and containing an analysis of the technical 
risks and risks of bias associated with the choice of data and operating system or arising 
from the environment (risks of external attacks). Arguments must also be presented 
to justify the choices made. Another issue to be addressed is whether any negative or 
unlawful consequences of the system's operation are capable of being reversed. The 
principle of security requires that the "ethical values by design" principles be applied 
as far as practicable. As noted in OECD Recommendation No. 5 on the security of 
processing using AI: “AI systems should be robust, secure and safe throughout 
their entire lifecycle so that, in conditions of normal use, foreseeable use or 
misuse, or other adverse conditions, they function appropriately and do not 
pose unreasonable safety risk. To this end, AI actors should ensure 
traceability, including in relation to datasets, processes and decisions made 
during the AI system lifecycle, to enable analysis of the AI system’s outcomes 
and responses to inquiry, appropriate to the context and consistent with the 
state of art.AI actors should, based on their  roles, the context, and their 
ability to act, apply a systematic risk management approach to each phase of 
the AI system lifecycle on a continuous basis to address risks related to AI 
systems, including privacy, digital security, safety and bias.” 74 
                                                          
72 P. TERZIS, “The reasonable coder”, article available on Academia edu, 2019 
73 See the 2010 Recommendation on “‘Profiling”, Article 9.2 : “Furthermore, in cases of processing that use 
profiling and entail special risks with regard to the protection of privacy and personal data, member states may 
foresee: a. either: 
a.         that controllers have to notify the supervisory authority in advance of the processing; or 
b.         that this processing is subject to prior checking by the supervisory authority.” 
74 See also the Policy Document prepared by the High Level Group of Experts on AI for the EU: “Trustworthy AI 
requires algorithms to be secure, reliable and robust enough to deal with errors or inconsistencies during all life 
cycle phases of the AI system, and to adequately cope with erroneous outcomes. AI systems need to be reliable, 
secure enough to be resilient against both overt attacks and more subtle attempts to manipulate data or 
algorithms themselves, and they must ensure a fall-back plan in case of problems. Their decisions must be 
accurate, or at least correctly reflect their level of accuracy, and their outcomes should be reproducible. In 
addition, AI systems should integrate safety and security-by-design mechanisms to ensure that they are verifiably 
safe at every step, taking at heart the physical and mental safety of all concerned. This includes the minimisation 






F. System transparency (Article 8) 
 
54. Information on what: the logic involved? The information specifically provided for on 
the basis of Article 8.1. requires little comment. The second paragraph of the article, 
however, provides for additional obligations in respect of information where such 
information is necessary “in order to ensure fair and transparent processing of the 
personal data”. It goes without saying that anyone who is being profiled must be made 
aware of the existence of such profiling via an icon that allows them to access the basic 
and additional information which controllers are required to provide. In the case of 
high risk profiling, they should also be told about the procedure regarding participatory 
assessment (access to the report may additionally be required by the data protection 
authority) and on how profiling is likely to affect the person being profiled. For that 
reason, too, the GDPR further requires that information be provided regarding the 
“logic involved” in the system, the very terms used in the Council of Europe’s 
recommendation of 2010. 
 
55. A step further – some thoughts regarding the expression “logic involved”:   
- the term “logic involved”, while it is appropriate when dealing with traditional expert 
systems, reflecting the thinking of the experts in question in given types of situations 
or decisions, is not appropriate when using machine learning systems that rely on 
statistical correlations rather than causal logics. In such cases, there should, at a 
minimum, be a requirement for the system’s operation to be “explainable”. The High 
Level Group of Experts of the European Commission, for instance, has a very broad 
“explainability” requirement, in that not only the functioning of the algorithm but also 
its role in the organisational process and the justification for the use of AI must be 
explainable: “Linked to this, explainability of the algorithmic decision-making process, 
adapted to the persons involved, should be provided to the extent possible. Ongoing 
research to develop explainability mechanisms should be pursued. In addition, 
explanations of the degree to which an AI system influences and shapes the 
organisational decision-making process, design choices of the system, as well as the 
rationale for deploying it, should be available (hence ensuring not just data and system 
transparency, but also business model transparency)”75. 
 
- What kind of information is meant by the requirement to make individuals aware of 
the logic involved or, in the case of machine learning, the requirement to make the 
                                                          
clarify and assess potential risks associated with the use of AI systems, across various application areas, should 
be put in place.” 
75 The OECD recommendation also talks about explainability with regard to the requisite transparency in the case 
of AI systems, taking a fairly broad view of it: “AI Actors should commit to transparency and responsible 
disclosure regarding AI systems. To this end, they should provide meaningful information, 
appropriate to the context, and consistent with the state of art:   
i.to foster a general understanding of AI systems,  
ii.to make stakeholders aware of their interactions with AI systems, including in the workplace,  
iii.to enable those affected by an AI system to understand the outcome, and,  
iv.to enable those adversely affected by an AI system to challenge its outcome b ased on plain 
and easy-to-understand information on the factors, and the logic that served as the basis for 





workings of the system explainable? Article 9.c of the Convention refers to the right to 
obtain knowledge of the "reasoning underlying data processing”. This wording is 
vague and erroneous in that, in AI, it is not possible to talk meaningfully about 
reasoning, as that would imply a causalist view, where the system operates on the 
basis of correlations that are, to a greater or lesser degree, supervised76. Is it necessary 
to attend a course on machine learning in order to be able to explain the kind of 
calculations that are performed? Do the calculations behind a particular decision need 
to be explained? Is it necessary to give very specific details or will a vague indication of 
the weight assigned to each item of personal information in the decision suffice? Is 
there proportionality in the requirement for transparency depending on the nature of 
the decision and its impact on the data subject? Whatever the case, the data subject 
must be placed in a position where they can understand how the system works and 
why a particular unfavourable recommendation, decision or prediction about them has 
been made77. Clearly that means providing information about anonymous or 
                                                          
76 With regard to the expression “logic involved” used in the GDPR, see the “Guidelines on Automated individual 
decision-making and Profiling”, published by the Article 29 Working Party and since endorsed by the EDPB, on 3 
October 2017 and revised on 6 February 2018, WP251rev.01 (text available on the EDPB site: 
https://edpb.europa.eu/edpb_en: “Data controllers should find simple ways to tell the data subject[s] about the 
rationale behind, or the criteria relied on in reaching the decision[s] [… but] not necessarily a complex explanation 
of the algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm. The information provided should, however, be 
sufficiently comprehensive for the data subject to understand the reasons for the decision”. 
  
77 By way of comparison, as regards the ranking of websites by online intermediation services, Article 5 of EU 
Regulation 2019/1150 of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online 
intermediation services (OJEU 11.7. 2019, L 186/57) likewise requires providers of these services to be 
transparent vis-à-vis business users of their services about the ranking of sites by the online intermediation 
service provider (platform operators):  “Providers of online intermediation services shall set out in their terms and 
conditions the main parameters determining ranking and the reasons for the relative importance of those main 
parameters as opposed to other parameters. 
2.   Providers of online search engines shall set out the main parameters, which individually or collectively are 
most significant in determining ranking and the relative importance of those main parameters, by providing an 
easily and publicly available description, drafted in plain and intelligible language, on the online search engines 
of those providers. They shall keep that description up to date. 
3.   Where the main parameters include the possibility to influence ranking against any direct or indirect 
remuneration paid by business users or corporate website users to the respective provider, that provider shall 
also set out a description of those possibilities and of the effects of such remuneration on ranking in accordance 
with the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
4.   …  
5.   The descriptions referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be sufficient to enable the business users or 
corporate website users to obtain an adequate understanding of whether, and if so how and to what extent, the 
ranking mechanism takes account of the following: 
(a) the characteristics of the goods and services offered to consumers through the online intermediation services 
or the online search engine;  
 
(b) the relevance of those characteristics for those consumers; 
 
(c) as regards online search engines, the design characteristics of the website used by corporate website users.” 
Article 6 a) of the draft directive recently approved by the European Parliament on better enforcement and 
modernisation of EU consumer protection rules (Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 





unprocessed data and where they came from, how the algorithm works and, although 
probably without going into specifics, the weight assigned to each type of data in the 
basic algorithm. It is surely reasonable to suppose that the “logic involved” in any 
decision requires that the data subject be told about everything that went into 
producing the result, not only the data but also the ways in which the system combines 
and relates them. This information should be displayed on a website accessible via the 
icon that warns the data subject they are being profiled. We also believe that the need 
for transparency should be paramount and take precedence over any arguments put 
forward by those controllers who would seek – wrongly - to oppose any 
communication about the logic or explainability of the chosen profiling system on the 
grounds of copyright, patents or trade secrets78. The principle must be asserted that 
trade secrets and intellectual property rights are but a partial defence against 
disclosure and may be relied on only to the extent strictly necessary to protect the 
interests of their holders.  
-the use of profiling by administrations must be subject to more stringent rules on 
transparency, except where it is justified by overriding reasons in the general interest 
or where the purpose of the processing is to identify fraudsters or other criminals. The 
idea of having systems, in particular AI systems, assessed by a supervisory body, 
especially in order to avoid bias and discrimination, and of publishing the algorithms 
involved in the operation, a corollary of the obligation on public decision-makers to 
give reasons for their decisions, would seem to us to be essential. This obligation has 
implications for public procurement, especially for suppliers or rather designers of 
algorithms. 
-Last but not least: as a result of this transparency, civil liberties or civil society groups 
or even the prosecution service could litigate on behalf of individuals who have been 
excluded or injured as members of discriminated groups, on behalf of the groups 
themselves or in the public interest. In the context of one-to-one insurance, which 
poses a threat to the principle of mutualisation, one could imagine, for example, 
representatives of the public interest or consumer groups acting on behalf of persons 
affected by the system, even if they are not necessarily data subjects. Whatever the 
case, the insistence on transparency remains one of the key requirements necessary 
to ensure confidence in the functioning of our systems. We believe, therefore, that the 
Council of Europe should encourage research in this area and urge companies to make 
their algorithms available to all on an open-source basis.   
                                                          
…as regards better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules) takes a similar line, 
focusing this time on the information that operators must provide to consumers who use their platforms, where 
ranking sites is concerned.  
78 Compare recital 63 of the GDPR which reads: “This right (of access to the logic involved) should not affect the 
rights and freedoms of others, in particular, not adversely affect trade secrets or intellectual property or the 
copyright protecting the software. However, the result of those considerations should not be a refusal to provide 






55. Rights of the data subject in automated decision-making - The rights of data 
subjects “not to be subject to a purely automated decision significantly affecting them 
without having their views taken into consideration” call for the following comments: 
-the expression “significantly affecting” has been extensively discussed in similar terms 
by the European Union’s Article 29 Group. The idea is that consideration should be 
given to the context, the data subjects and the duration of the consequences (for 
example, denying someone a visa after they have applied for immigration cannot be 
equated with using profiling to set prices); 
-the term "purely" poses a problem: it will need to be determined to what extent the 
human being responsible for acting on the proposal generated by the computer 
possesses, within the framework of their organisation and the procedure prescribed 
therein, a genuine capacity, in terms of time and competence, to deviate from the 
proposal and actually exercises that capacity;   
- "without having their views taken into consideration” requires that the person be 
duly informed of this possibility of expressing their views, that specific provision be 
made within the organisation for the procedure to be followed in such matters and 
that, as far as possible, the person in question be able to get help and support.   
To be effective, this last requirement demands under Article 9.1.c) that the person be 
able to obtain a written explanation of the criteria used to justify the decision and how 
these apply in their specific case. Obviously, exceptions79 must be permitted in cases 
where access to this reasoning runs counter to the higher interests of the controller, 
as enshrined in law80 (eg in the fight against fraud) (see Article 9.2., which mentions, 
                                                          
79 In our view, Section 5.4 of the 2010 recommendation is worth repeating here: “If there are any grounds for 
restricting the rights set out in this section in accordance with Section 6, this decision should be communicated to 
the data subject by any means that allows it to be put on record, with a mention of the legal and factual reasons 
for such a restriction. This mention may be omitted when a reason exists which endangers the aim of the 
restriction. In such cases, information should be given to the data subject on how to challenge this decision before 
the competent national supervisory authority, a judicial authority or a court.” 
80 Needless to say, this law must be specific, unambiguous and pursue objectives consistent with the 
requirements of a  democratic society. Sweeping references to exceptions such as “consent” or “the existence 
of a contractual relationship” are inadvisable, in our view. Section 5.5 of the 2010 recommendation reads:  
“Where a person is subject to a decision having legal effects concerning him or her or significantly 
affecting him or her, taken on the sole basis of profiling, he or she should be able to object to the 
decision unless: 
 
a. this is provided for by law, which lays down measures to safeguard data subjects’ legitimate interests, 
particularly by allowing them to put forward their point of view; 
b. the decision was taken in the course of the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or for 
the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken at the request of the data subject and that measures for 
safeguarding the legitimate interests of the data subject are in place.” 
See also recommendation 6 which widens the scope to include the principles of legitimacy and transparency of 
profiling: “Where it is necessary in a democratic society for reasons of state security, public safety, the monetary 
interests of the state or the prevention and suppression of criminal offences, or protecting the data subject or the 
rights and freedoms of others, member states need not apply the provisions set out in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the 





however, the need for “suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights, 
freedoms and legitimate interests81”) or where such access is impossible owing to the 
complexity of the correlations performed by the machine, making the machine’s 
operating "model" (deep learning system) intelligible, even to the system developer. 
In this last instance, the controller will nevertheless provide all the information in their 
possession as part of the “explainability” requirements (see our comments on Article 
8 above). In this respect, the High Level Expert Group on AI appointed by the European 
Commission calls for the various decisions taken by the system to be “traceable”: “The 
traceability of AI systems should be ensured; it is important to log and document both 
the decisions made by the systems, as well as the entire process (including a description 
of data gathering and labelling, and a description of the algorithm used) that yielded 
the decisions”.  
 
56. Rights of the data subject - The following recommendations (Sections 5.2 and 5.3) 
from the 2010 text are worth citing here: “Data subjects should be entitled to secure, 
as the case may be, correction, deletion or blocking of their personal data, where 
profiling in the course of personal data processing is performed contrary to the 
provisions of domestic law which enforce the principles set out in this recommendation. 
Unless the law provides for profiling in the context of personal data processing, the 
data subject should be entitled to object on compelling legitimate grounds relating to 
his or her situation to the use of his or her personal data for profiling. Where there is 
justified objection, the profiling should no longer involve the use of the personal data 
of the data subject. Where the purpose of the processing is direct marketing, the data 
subject does not have to present any justification.”   
 
G. Additional obligations depending on the characteristics of the profiling (Article 10)  
 
57. The principle of accountability - Articles 10.1 and 10.4 enshrine the principle of 
accountability. It is for the controller(s) to show that they have complied with the 
obligations stemming from any profiling performed by them, having due regard to the 
risks associated with these operations. The quality of the data will need to be checked, 
therefore, to ensure not only that they are accurate and up to date, but also that there 
is no bias in the way they are used in a given application. The same caution extends to 
the algorithm(s) used, whether developed by the controller themselves or elsewhere. 
The next step will be to document the various operations involved in processing, and 
keep logs of the decisions made. Lastly, the controller will stipulate the organisational 
procedures necessary to ensure that the right to have a human involved in the decision 
is respected and that data subjects are genuinely able to express their views and, 
should they do so, to have them taken on board. Clearly, all these obligations could be 
                                                          
 
81 For example, in profiling carried out for the purpose of investigating crimes, any suspects identified in this way 
would need to be placed in a clearly separate category from suspects identified through traditional investigative 





the subject of certification by the AI systems supervisory body mentioned above or by 
other bodies accredited by it.  
 
This obligation on the part of the data controller does not mean that the other players 
operating on a commercial basis and offering one or more components (datasets, 
algorithms) are absolved of their responsibilities. Accordingly, depending on the 
"foreseeable" risks associated with their operation, the algorithm provider will 
document the product they are marketing, describing the applications for which it is 
designed or, on the contrary, those for which it must not or should not be used, and 
the fact that it has already been applied or tested, and will collaborate during the test 
period, etc. It is, of course, conceivable that these products might also be certified for 
a particular sector or for general use. 
 
Article 10.2 introduces a duty for controllers and, where applicable, processors to carry 
out a risk assessment and to implement organisational and technical measures to 
reduce these risks in the case of any processing. It goes without saying that it is the 
internal responsibility of the organisation that uses profiling, or develops tools for the 
purpose of profiling, to train those involved in carrying out the processing or producing 
the tools to detect and combat the risks associated with profiling. In addition, these 
bodies will, where appropriate, promote the interdisciplinary and open discussion 
necessary for such detection and consideration. We have talked at length about what 
this obligation means in the case of high risk profiling and would remind the reader 
that this notion ought to be explored further, not only through sectoral approaches 
(medicine, retailing, platforms, banking and insurance, policing, etc) but also according 
to certain types of relationships (see the issue of profiling in the context of labour 
relations). Any risk assessment of this kind requires consultation with external groups 




H. Role of supervisory authorities (Article 15) 
 
58. Some roles for the supervisory authority with regard to specific aspects of the use of 
AI in profiling - Multiple roles should be assigned to the supervisory authorities, 
working together if possible. Collaboration with the independent interdisciplinary 
authority responsible for testing, evaluating (mandatory evaluation at least for AI 
profiling performed by public authorities, voluntary for others but with a requirement 
for those responsible for high risk processing to send the risk assessment report to the 
authority and to inform it of the steps taken to mitigate this risk), identifying, where 
appropriate, best practices and issuing labels certifying compliance with the 
requirements of the Convention. We would also draw attention to Section 9.2 of the 
2010 recommendation which reads: "Furthermore, in cases of processing that use 
profiling and entail special risks with regard to the protection of privacy and personal 
data, member states may foresee either: a. that controllers have to notify the 
supervisory authority in advance of the processing; or b. that this processing is subject 
to prior checking by the supervisory authority.” In our opinion, this competence 





regard to the sometimes highly sophisticated data processing techniques or, at the 
very least, a basic knowledge of how they work, their limitations and potential. The 
aim will be to strengthen the links between AI academics and supervisory authorities. 
Academics can also play a role in advising the Convention Committee of Convention 
108.14.3.b. It is essential that academics specialising in AI be involved in every 
standardisation process lest it become "artificial" (sic) or completely "disconnected” 
from technical and/or technological reality.  
 
Member states should mandate the independent supervisory authorities to ensure 
compliance with the domestic law implementing the principles set out in this 
recommendation. To this end, they must have the necessary powers of investigation 
and intervention, in particular the power to hear claims lodged by individuals. 
Furthermore, in cases of processing that use profiling and entail specific risks with 
regard to the protection of privacy and personal data, member states may, particularly 
in the case of high risk processing and profiling by public authorities, either require 
controllers to notify the supervisory authority of such risks in advance or insist that this 
processing is subject to prior checking by the supervisory authority. 
 
59. Two rather sensitive issues deserve attention. The first concerns the duty on the part 
of the supervisory authorities, on the one hand, and the consumer protection and 
competition authorities on the other, to engage in co-operation, with regard to the 
assessment and supervision of profiling; there is also a duty to co-operate with the 
institutions responsible for ensuring equal opportunities or promoting democracy. The 
second point is more tricky. We have observed that, in addition to those matters that 
are unquestionably within the realm of data protection, there are wider issues at play, 
relating to social justice, group protection and the threat to democracy. It is evident 
from the texts that the focus is on protecting individuals without considering the 
challenges that digital technology presents for society, even if, in practice, the 
authorities are not afraid to act on a broader front. This tendency on the part of the 
supervisory authorities should be monitored. In my view, it would be dangerous to 
exclude data protection authorities from such debates when the Convention provides 
effective instruments for assessing risks (see the risk assessment procedure82), for 
informing data subjects and, above all, for challenging decisions taken on an 
automated basis. We suggest that the authorities broaden their field of inquiry to 
include collective and societal risks. They will ensure that their opinions mention such 
risks and that they are factored into their decisions. Where appropriate, they will 
initiate debate on the subject. They will draw the attention of member states to the 
importance of broadening their remit in this area. Until their powers are extended, 
                                                          
82 It is surprising to note that the Article 29 Working Party’s Guidelines endorsed by the EDPB: Guidelines on Data 
Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is "likely to result in a high risk" for the 
purposes of Regulation 2016/679, wp248rev.01 (available at: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=611236) mention only the risks incurred by the data subject, without looking at the impact 
this processing could have on other individuals, groups or society: “The GDPR does not require a DPIA to be 
carried out for every processing operation which may result in risks for the rights and freedoms of natural persons. 
The carrying out of a DPIA is only mandatory where processing is “likely to result in a high risk to the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons” (Article 35(1), illustrated by Article 35(3) and complemented by Article 35(4)). It is 





they might not be able to impose sanctions in this area, but there is nothing to prevent 
our authorities from exercising supervision, conducting investigations and initiating 
public debate on the subject and stigmatising any practices that are incompatible, if 
not with data protection legislation, then at least with democratic values, in particular 
dignity and social justice. In this context, the supervisory authorities should receive 
and investigate complaints from associations which concern the collective interests of 
a particular group or the public interest at large. Where appropriate, the authorities 
will make recommendations on this subject. They should inform the public of the 
application of the legislation implementing the principles set out in this 
recommendation. 
 
One final role that should be assigned to the supervisory authorities is information and 
public awareness raising about both the benefits and the drawbacks of profiling. That 
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